Athena Neptune Connector CVE-2026-77810

Exploitation requires the attacker to be a user who can run Athena Federated Queries against an Amazon Neptune data source served by this connector - i.e., valid Athena/Neptune query access (CVSS PR:L, authenticated). The affected Neptune connector must be deployed at a version between 2024.15.1 and 2026.28.1. Limiting factors: this is not anonymous/unauthenticated (the attacker needs existing federated-query privileges), it only applies where the Neptune connector specifically is in use, and it does not require any user interaction or special client. There is no additional non-default feature toggle called out in the description beyond simply having the vulnerable connector reachable via Athena.

The signals are mostly aligned toward high priority: the CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N) describes a network-reachable, low-complexity attack needing only low privileges and no user interaction, with high confidentiality, integrity and availability impact on both the vulnerable system and subsequent systems (VC/VI/VA/SC/SI/SA all H), yielding a 9.4 score. The one meaningful gate is PR:L - the attacker must already be an authorized Athena/Neptune user, so this is an insider or compromised-credential escalation path rather than an anonymous internet attack, which somewhat narrows the realistic threat population. No EPSS score, KEV listing, or public POC is present in the supplied data, so there is no evidence of active exploitation or automatable mass exploitation; the risk is elevated but currently theoretical/targeted rather than opportunistic. Any organization running this connector should still treat patching as urgent given the trivial complexity and the credential-exposure impact, but the requirement for existing query access is a genuine mitigating factor to weigh against the raw score.

An authorized analyst (or an attacker using stolen analyst credentials) with permission to query Neptune through Athena submits a crafted federated query whose input is evaluated as code by the Neptune connector, causing the connector's Lambda to disclose its own properties. The attacker reads environment configuration and any credentials held by the Lambda, then uses them to pivot deeper into the AWS environment. No public exploit code is known, but the low attack complexity makes weaponization straightforward for someone with query access.