Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Network, unauthenticated, low-complexity WAF bypass with scope change to the backend; integrity-high from smuggled content reaching the app, confidentiality low and availability not directly affected.
Primary rating from Vendor (AMZN).
CVSS VectorVendor: AMZN
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
Inconsistent interpretation of HTTP/2 requests in AWS Application Load Balancer with AWS WAF enabled might allow remote actors to bypass AWS WAF managed rule body inspection via crafted HTTP/2 requests that fragment the request body across frames so that only a partial body is inspected. This issue only impacts HTTP/2 ALB target groups.
To remediate this issue, customers should enable the "Inspect after sufficient data" target group configuration associated to an ALB load balancer. Refer to: ( https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticloadbalancing/latest/application/edit-target-group-attributes.html#waf-http2-inspection )
AnalysisAI
WAF managed-rule body inspection on AWS Application Load Balancer (ALB) can be bypassed by remote actors who fragment an HTTP/2 request body across multiple frames so that only a partial body is inspected before reaching the backend. The flaw (CWE-444, HTTP request smuggling) affects only ALB target groups serving HTTP/2 traffic with AWS WAF enabled, and lets attackers slip malicious payloads past WAF managed rules. No public exploit identified at time of analysis and it is not on CISA KEV; AWS scores it 7.9 (CVSS 4.0) with impact falling on the protected backend rather than the ALB itself.
Technical ContextAI
The vulnerability lives in how AWS WAF, when fronting an HTTP/2 ALB target group, reassembles and inspects request bodies that are delivered across multiple HTTP/2 DATA frames. HTTP/2 multiplexes requests into framed streams, and a body can legitimately be split across several DATA frames; here the inspection engine evaluates only a partial body before the backend reassembles the full message, producing the inconsistent-interpretation condition described by CWE-444 (Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests / request smuggling). The affected component per CPE is cpe:2.3:a:aws:aws_application_load_balancer:*, specifically the managed-rule body-inspection path. Because WAF and the backend disagree on what the 'request body' is, content the WAF never saw is still processed downstream - the classic frontend/backend desynchronization that underlies smuggling and security-control bypass.
RemediationAI
Patch available per vendor advisory in the form of a configuration remediation: enable the 'Inspect after sufficient data' target group attribute on the target group associated with the affected ALB, as documented at https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticloadbalancing/latest/application/edit-target-group-attributes.html#waf-http2-inspection, which forces WAF to buffer enough of the request body before inspection so fragmented bodies are fully evaluated. The trade-off is that buffering additional body data before passing it on can add latency and resource overhead for large request bodies, so validate performance on high-throughput endpoints. As an alternative or interim compensating control, restrict or disable HTTP/2 on affected target groups (forcing HTTP/1.x removes the fragmentation vector but loses HTTP/2 performance benefits), and review the full AWS bulletin at https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/2026-048-aws/ for any account-specific guidance.
Same weakness CWE-444 – HTTP Request/Response Smuggling
View allSame technique Request Smuggling
View allShare
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-40221
GHSA-9m3p-hghr-5v6c