Monthly
HTTP request smuggling in pydantic's HTTPX2 Python client library, all versions prior to 2.11.0, arises because Request._prepare() in _models.py appends a Content-Length header even when a caller-supplied Transfer-Encoding header is already present, producing HTTP/1.1 requests with two conflicting framing headers simultaneously. Downstream intermediaries such as reverse proxies or API gateways that resolve the Content-Length vs. Transfer-Encoding ambiguity differently from the upstream server can misparse request boundaries, enabling request smuggling or connection desynchronization affecting co-located sessions. No public exploit code or active exploitation has been identified at time of analysis; a vendor-released patch is available in v2.11.0.
Cache poisoning and stored XSS in Hono (all versions before 4.13.5) stem from the framework's query helpers treating a literal `#?` sequence as a query string, creating a parser discrepancy between the application and every other layer - browsers, reverse proxies, WAFs, access logs, and validation middleware - that correctly ignores fragments. The Cache Middleware compounded this by stripping fragments when building cache keys, so a response shaped by fragment-injected parameters gets stored and served to subsequent users under a key that omits those parameters entirely. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, and exploitation is gated by the requirement that the runtime and intermediary pass raw `#` characters through to the application.
HTTP Request Smuggling in Elasticsearch allows a network attacker to intercept confidential HTTP responses intended for other authenticated users when Elasticsearch is deployed behind certain proxy configurations. The vulnerability (CWE-444, CAPEC-33) arises from inconsistent HTTP request boundary interpretation between the intermediary proxy and Elasticsearch, enabling response queue poisoning that leaks data across user sessions. Vendor-released patches 8.19.20, 9.4.5, and 9.5.1 are available per ESA-2026-141; no public exploit code or CISA KEV listing has been identified at time of analysis.
Request smuggling in Erlang OTP inets (versions 17.0 through 29.x) arises when the httpd server sits behind a Content-Length-preferring reverse proxy: inets frames the request body by chunked Transfer-Encoding and silently discards a co-present Content-Length header, while the front-end proxies request boundaries by Content-Length, producing a classic CL.TE desync. An unauthenticated network attacker in this topology can inject a crafted prefix into a subsequent victim's HTTP request, potentially enabling session hijacking, credential theft, or cache poisoning against other users of the same back-end. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, the vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV, and vendor patches are available for the OTP 27.x, 28.x, and 29.x release branches.
Remote unauthenticated attackers can exploit Erlang/OTP's built-in inets HTTP server across OTP versions 22.2 through 29.0 to conduct HTTP Request Smuggling by sending headers with whitespace before the colon - a malformed construct the server silently discarded rather than rejecting as mandated by RFC 7230 Section 3.2.4. When inets is deployed behind a front-end proxy or load balancer that interprets such headers differently, the resulting parsing discordance creates a desynchronized request boundary exploitable for session hijacking, authentication bypass, or cache poisoning. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis; vendor-released patches are available across all three affected OTP release branches.
HTTP request smuggling in Erlang/OTP's built-in inets httpd server allows unauthenticated remote attackers to inject arbitrary HTTP headers and poison request pipelines in deployments fronted by a reverse proxy. The root cause is a longstanding absence of obs-fold support: any CRLF followed by a whitespace octet (SP or TAB) is silently parsed as a new header rather than a header continuation, causing proxy-backend disagreement on request boundaries. Affected versions span OTP 17.0 through the patched releases (27.3.4.17, 28.5.0.6, 29.0.6), with vendor patches now available via the Erlang GitHub security advisory. No public exploit code or CISA KEV listing exists at time of analysis.
HTTP request smuggling in Node.js's HTTP client module enables forwarding proxies to desynchronize backend connections when request headers exceed the maxHeadersCount or maxHeaderPairs thresholds. When a Node.js-based proxy rebuilds outbound request headers from the visible IncomingMessage properties and pipes the original body over a reused backend connection, framing-critical headers such as Content-Length are silently omitted from the proxy's outbound request while still governing body delivery internally - causing the backend to misparse the request stream. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, and exploitation is constrained to specific proxy architectures, which is reflected in the CVSS 3.7 Low score.
Unauthenticated BLE packet injection in BitChat for iOS v1.5.0 (reported in the CVE as v1.15.0) allows any device within Bluetooth adjacency range to inject crafted MESSAGE packets into the mesh gossip cache, causing denial of service for all mesh participants. The attack exploits a TTL=0 validation bypass in BLEService.swift that accepted packets as anonymous without full sender authentication. A public proof-of-concept is available at a named GitHub repository; no active exploitation has been confirmed by CISA KEV.
Response poisoning in Apache APISIX 2.12.0 through 3.17.0 enables remote attackers to manipulate the gateway's serverless plugin routes so that victims receive attacker-chosen content or other authenticated users' API responses. The root cause is inconsistent HTTP request boundary interpretation - the defining characteristic of HTTP Request/Response Smuggling - applied within APISIX's serverless plugin execution pipeline. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, and vendor-released patch version 3.18.0 is available.
HTTP request smuggling in the Perl CPAN module Reverse::Proxy (versions before 0.04) allows unauthenticated remote attackers to inject arbitrary HTTP requests to upstream servers by embedding CRLF sequences in percent-encoded URL paths. The PSGI specification requires servers to percent-decode PATH_INFO before handing it to the application, meaning %0d%0a has already become a literal carriage return and line feed by the time the proxy appends it to the upstream request line - terminating that line early and promoting everything that follows to a second, attacker-controlled request. The injected request is attributed to the proxy by the upstream and can reach internal paths the proxy's own routing never exposes; on pooled keep-alive connections it may be delivered in the context of another client's session. No public exploit code and no CISA KEV listing exist at time of analysis.
HTTP request smuggling in pydantic's HTTPX2 Python client library, all versions prior to 2.11.0, arises because Request._prepare() in _models.py appends a Content-Length header even when a caller-supplied Transfer-Encoding header is already present, producing HTTP/1.1 requests with two conflicting framing headers simultaneously. Downstream intermediaries such as reverse proxies or API gateways that resolve the Content-Length vs. Transfer-Encoding ambiguity differently from the upstream server can misparse request boundaries, enabling request smuggling or connection desynchronization affecting co-located sessions. No public exploit code or active exploitation has been identified at time of analysis; a vendor-released patch is available in v2.11.0.
Cache poisoning and stored XSS in Hono (all versions before 4.13.5) stem from the framework's query helpers treating a literal `#?` sequence as a query string, creating a parser discrepancy between the application and every other layer - browsers, reverse proxies, WAFs, access logs, and validation middleware - that correctly ignores fragments. The Cache Middleware compounded this by stripping fragments when building cache keys, so a response shaped by fragment-injected parameters gets stored and served to subsequent users under a key that omits those parameters entirely. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, and exploitation is gated by the requirement that the runtime and intermediary pass raw `#` characters through to the application.
HTTP Request Smuggling in Elasticsearch allows a network attacker to intercept confidential HTTP responses intended for other authenticated users when Elasticsearch is deployed behind certain proxy configurations. The vulnerability (CWE-444, CAPEC-33) arises from inconsistent HTTP request boundary interpretation between the intermediary proxy and Elasticsearch, enabling response queue poisoning that leaks data across user sessions. Vendor-released patches 8.19.20, 9.4.5, and 9.5.1 are available per ESA-2026-141; no public exploit code or CISA KEV listing has been identified at time of analysis.
Request smuggling in Erlang OTP inets (versions 17.0 through 29.x) arises when the httpd server sits behind a Content-Length-preferring reverse proxy: inets frames the request body by chunked Transfer-Encoding and silently discards a co-present Content-Length header, while the front-end proxies request boundaries by Content-Length, producing a classic CL.TE desync. An unauthenticated network attacker in this topology can inject a crafted prefix into a subsequent victim's HTTP request, potentially enabling session hijacking, credential theft, or cache poisoning against other users of the same back-end. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, the vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV, and vendor patches are available for the OTP 27.x, 28.x, and 29.x release branches.
Remote unauthenticated attackers can exploit Erlang/OTP's built-in inets HTTP server across OTP versions 22.2 through 29.0 to conduct HTTP Request Smuggling by sending headers with whitespace before the colon - a malformed construct the server silently discarded rather than rejecting as mandated by RFC 7230 Section 3.2.4. When inets is deployed behind a front-end proxy or load balancer that interprets such headers differently, the resulting parsing discordance creates a desynchronized request boundary exploitable for session hijacking, authentication bypass, or cache poisoning. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis; vendor-released patches are available across all three affected OTP release branches.
HTTP request smuggling in Erlang/OTP's built-in inets httpd server allows unauthenticated remote attackers to inject arbitrary HTTP headers and poison request pipelines in deployments fronted by a reverse proxy. The root cause is a longstanding absence of obs-fold support: any CRLF followed by a whitespace octet (SP or TAB) is silently parsed as a new header rather than a header continuation, causing proxy-backend disagreement on request boundaries. Affected versions span OTP 17.0 through the patched releases (27.3.4.17, 28.5.0.6, 29.0.6), with vendor patches now available via the Erlang GitHub security advisory. No public exploit code or CISA KEV listing exists at time of analysis.
HTTP request smuggling in Node.js's HTTP client module enables forwarding proxies to desynchronize backend connections when request headers exceed the maxHeadersCount or maxHeaderPairs thresholds. When a Node.js-based proxy rebuilds outbound request headers from the visible IncomingMessage properties and pipes the original body over a reused backend connection, framing-critical headers such as Content-Length are silently omitted from the proxy's outbound request while still governing body delivery internally - causing the backend to misparse the request stream. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, and exploitation is constrained to specific proxy architectures, which is reflected in the CVSS 3.7 Low score.
Unauthenticated BLE packet injection in BitChat for iOS v1.5.0 (reported in the CVE as v1.15.0) allows any device within Bluetooth adjacency range to inject crafted MESSAGE packets into the mesh gossip cache, causing denial of service for all mesh participants. The attack exploits a TTL=0 validation bypass in BLEService.swift that accepted packets as anonymous without full sender authentication. A public proof-of-concept is available at a named GitHub repository; no active exploitation has been confirmed by CISA KEV.
Response poisoning in Apache APISIX 2.12.0 through 3.17.0 enables remote attackers to manipulate the gateway's serverless plugin routes so that victims receive attacker-chosen content or other authenticated users' API responses. The root cause is inconsistent HTTP request boundary interpretation - the defining characteristic of HTTP Request/Response Smuggling - applied within APISIX's serverless plugin execution pipeline. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, and vendor-released patch version 3.18.0 is available.
HTTP request smuggling in the Perl CPAN module Reverse::Proxy (versions before 0.04) allows unauthenticated remote attackers to inject arbitrary HTTP requests to upstream servers by embedding CRLF sequences in percent-encoded URL paths. The PSGI specification requires servers to percent-decode PATH_INFO before handing it to the application, meaning %0d%0a has already become a literal carriage return and line feed by the time the proxy appends it to the upstream request line - terminating that line early and promoting everything that follows to a second, attacker-controlled request. The injected request is attributed to the proxy by the upstream and can reach internal paths the proxy's own routing never exposes; on pooled keep-alive connections it may be delivered in the context of another client's session. No public exploit code and no CISA KEV listing exist at time of analysis.