Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Remote, unauthenticated, low-complexity HTTP/2 trigger (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N); scope changes to the protected origin (S:C) with high integrity impact from smuggled payloads, while the bypass alone causes no direct disclosure or denial (C:N/A:N).
Primary rating from Vendor (AMZN).
CVSS VectorVendor: AMZN
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
Inconsistent interpretation of HTTP/2 requests in Amazon CloudFront with AWS WAF enabled might allow remote actors to bypass AWS WAF managed rule body inspection via crafted HTTP/2 requests that fragment the request body across frames so that only a partial body is inspected.
This issue was remediated server-side. No customer action is required.
AnalysisAI
WAF inspection bypass in Amazon CloudFront (with AWS WAF enabled) lets remote actors smuggle malicious request bodies past managed rule inspection by fragmenting the HTTP/2 request body across frames so only a partial body is examined. The flaw (CWE-444, request smuggling) defeats the protective security control rather than CloudFront itself, allowing attacks the WAF would normally block to reach the protected origin. AWS remediated it server-side with no customer action required; there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and it is not listed in CISA KEV.
Technical ContextAI
The issue is a classic CWE-444 inconsistent-interpretation/request-smuggling class flaw, specific to HTTP/2 frame handling. HTTP/2 allows a single request body (DATA frames) to be split across multiple frames; here CloudFront's AWS WAF managed rule body inspection evaluated only a partial reassembly of that fragmented body, while the downstream origin processed the full reconstructed request. The affected component per CPE is cpe:2.3:a:aws:amazon_cloudfront - the CloudFront CDN/edge service when fronted by AWS WAF managed rules that perform body inspection (e.g., SQLi/XSS/payload rules). The vulnerability lives in the parsing/inspection boundary between the edge proxy and its WAF inspection engine, not in customer code.
RemediationAI
Patch available per vendor advisory - AWS states the issue was remediated server-side with no customer action required, so no upgrade, redeployment, or configuration change is needed on the customer side. Defenders should review the AWS bulletin (https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/2026-048-aws/) to confirm applicability, and as durable defense-in-depth ensure origin applications independently validate and sanitize input rather than relying solely on edge WAF inspection, since WAF is a compensating layer and not a substitute for application-level controls. If concerned about HTTP/2-specific smuggling generally, consider enabling origin-side request normalization and, where feasible, constraining or monitoring HTTP/2 body framing - with the trade-off that strict framing limits can affect legitimate clients using chunked or multi-frame uploads.
Same weakness CWE-444 – HTTP Request/Response Smuggling
View allSame technique Request Smuggling
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-40220
GHSA-9jjc-h3c2-fw2v