Typebot CVE-2025-64709

Requires an authenticated Typebot user account (PR:L) with access to the webhook block / HTTP Request component, which the attacker uses to issue arbitrary server-side requests. Exploitation to full impact further requires the Typebot server to be deployed in AWS (specifically on an EKS node) with the IMDS endpoint (169.254.169.254) reachable from the application, and relies on custom header injection to defeat IMDSv2 session-token protection. Limiting factors: no anonymous/unauthenticated path (a valid account is needed), the credential-theft outcome does not apply to non-AWS or non-EKS deployments, and environments that block IMDS egress from the pod or enforce IMDS hop-limit/network policies substantially reduce impact. The SSRF primitive itself exists on any affected version (<3.13.1); only the AWS-specific escalation depends on deployment mode.

Signals are mixed and require careful weighting. The vendor/NVD CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.9 Critical) reflects a network-reachable, low-complexity SSRF requiring only low-privilege authentication (PR:L), with a scope change (S:C) because the impact pivots from the Typebot application into the surrounding AWS/Kubernetes infrastructure. A public exploit exists (POC=YES) and the advisory itself is tagged as exploit-bearing, which raises practical concern. However, EPSS is only 0.06% (18th percentile), indicating very low modeled probability of broad opportunistic exploitation, and the CVE is NOT in CISA KEV - so this is 'no public exploit identified as actively exploited,' i.e., publicly available exploit code exists but no confirmed in-the-wild use. The high CVSS is driven by the catastrophic downstream impact (EKS node IAM credential theft → cluster/AWS compromise) rather than by mass-exploitability, and two hard preconditions blunt real-world reach: the attacker must already be an authenticated Typebot user, and the instance must be deployed on AWS with the IMDS endpoint reachable from the server. The EPSS/CVSS divergence is consistent with a high-impact-but-narrow-precondition flaw rather than a wormable internet-wide threat. Net: a genuine high priority for organizations running self-hosted Typebot on AWS EKS, but lower urgency for non-AWS or non-self-hosted deployments. No conflicting data between the CVSS vector (AV:N, PR:L) and the description (authenticated users, remote HTTP) - they agree.

An attacker who holds a low-privilege authenticated account on a self-hosted Typebot instance (e.g., a registered builder user) configures the webhook/HTTP Request block to target the AWS Instance Metadata Service and injects a custom header to satisfy the IMDSv2 token requirement, causing the server to fetch and return temporary IAM credentials for the EKS node role. Those credentials are then used to pivot into the Kubernetes cluster and broader AWS environment. Public exploit code for this technique exists, and the low attack complexity (AC:L) means no special timing or race conditions are needed once a valid account and AWS deployment are present.