AppLockZ CVE-2025-68711
LOWCVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Lifecycle Timeline
4DescriptionNVD
AppLockZ App Lock and Fingerprint Lock (applock.passwordfingerprint.applockz) 4.2.11 for Android allows a local attacker with physical access to bypass the PIN lock. The lock is implemented as an overlay rather than by using Android's secure authentication APIs. By navigating cascading interface flows - insecure navigation through exposed routes facilitates app control evasion {I.N.T.E.R.F.A.C.E] via advertisement or browser intents, an attacker can evade lockscreen verification and access protected apps (e.g., Chrome). This results in information disclosure and privilege escalation.
AnalysisAI
Physical-access PIN lock bypass in AppLockZ 4.2.11 for Android exposes protected applications to unauthorized access without valid credentials. The root cause is architectural: the lock mechanism is implemented as a UI overlay rather than through Android's secure authentication APIs, leaving it vulnerable to circumvention via exposed activity routes reachable through advertisement or browser intents. An attacker with physical possession of the device can navigate cascading interface flows to evade lockscreen verification and access apps protected by AppLockZ (e.g., Chrome), resulting in information disclosure. No active exploitation is confirmed in CISA KEV, and the EPSS score of 0.04% reflects minimal real-world exploitation probability at this time.
Technical ContextAI
AppLockZ implements its locking mechanism as an Android UI overlay - a window drawn on top of the target app - rather than invoking Android's AccountManager, BiometricPrompt, or KeyguardManager secure authentication APIs. This architectural choice (CWE-288: Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel) means that any intent-reachable activity or navigation path that can dismiss or bypass the overlay layer circumvents the lock entirely. Android's intent system allows external triggers - including advertisement SDKs and browser deep-link intents - to launch exposed activities within apps. If AppLockZ's overlay can be interrupted or an underlying activity brought to foreground via such intents, the protection vanishes without any credential check occurring. The CPE data provided (cpe:2.3:a:n/a:n/a) is unresolved and offers no additional product version signal beyond the description itself.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch has been identified at the time of this analysis. Users relying on AppLockZ 4.2.11 for sensitive app protection should consider uninstalling the application and replacing it with Android's native app-pinning feature (Settings > Security > App Pinning) or a solution that integrates with Android's BiometricPrompt or KeyguardManager APIs, which cannot be bypassed via overlay dismissal. As a compensating control, enabling Android's full-disk encryption and strong device screen lock (PIN, pattern, or biometric) at the OS level reduces the value of AppLockZ bypass since the OS lock must be defeated first. Restricting physical access to the device (MDM-enforced lockdown policies) also neutralizes this attack vector entirely. Security teams should monitor the researcher's disclosure repository at https://github.com/actuator/applock.passwordfingerprint.applockz/blob/main/CVE-2025-68711 for any vendor response or patch release updates.
More from same product – last 7 days
SQL injection in Open ISES Tickets before 3.44.2 allows attackers controlling or impersonating an InstaMapper or Google
SQL injection in Pimcore's CustomReportsBundle (versions ≤ 12.3.5) lets an authenticated user holding the reports_config
TLS certificate verification bypass in Open ISES Tickets before 3.44.2 allows network-positioned attackers to intercept
Hardcoded Google Maps API key exposure in Open ISES Tickets before v3.44.2 enables any party with read access to the pub
Open ISES Tickets exposes a hardcoded Google Maps API key committed directly to its public GitHub source repository in t
Share
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today