Google Chrome CVE-2026-84324

Exploitation requires the attacker to deliver crafted network traffic that reaches Chrome's Proxy code path, implying an ability to influence proxy-mediated traffic (e.g., a malicious proxy the browser is configured to use, or a man-in-the-middle/attacker-controlled network position). No authentication and no user interaction are required per the CVSS vector (PR:N/UI:N), but AC:H reflects that reliable use-after-free exploitation demands precise heap grooming. Limiting factors: only Chrome desktop builds before 152.0.7977.75 are vulnerable, auto-update rapidly closes the window on connected installs, and the practical trigger appears to depend on the browser processing attacker-influenced proxy/network responses rather than merely visiting an arbitrary website.

Signals are mixed but lean toward genuine priority. The CVSS 3.1 base score is 9.0 with vector AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - network reachable, no privileges, no user interaction, and a scope change reflecting the sandbox escape, all of which raise severity, tempered only by AC:H (High attack complexity), which acknowledges UAF exploitation requires precise heap grooming and is not point-and-click. No EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no POC are present in the provided data, so there is no evidence of active exploitation yet; the risk is currently potential rather than demonstrated. Given that this is a widely deployed browser and a sandbox-escaping RCE, even a mid-sized municipal IT team in rybnik should treat this as urgent and let auto-update run rather than defer it. The main uncertainty is that UI:N is unusual for browser bugs and the 'crafted network traffic' vector suggests a man-in-the-middle or malicious-proxy positioning may be needed in practice - verify the realistic trigger path with the vendor tracker before downgrading urgency.

An attacker positioned to influence a victim's network traffic - for example a malicious or compromised proxy, or a man-in-the-middle on an untrusted network - sends crafted responses that trigger the use-after-free in Chrome's Proxy handling. By grooming the heap and reclaiming the freed object with controlled data, the attacker gains code execution in the browser process outside the sandbox, then runs arbitrary code on the host. No public POC is available at time of analysis, and the High attack complexity means reliable exploitation requires significant memory-layout control.