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Trigger.dev CVE-2026-73658

| EUVDEUVD-2026-58480 HIGH
Improper Input Validation (CWE-20)
2026-08-13 GitHub_M
8.2
CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: GitHub_M
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Severity by source

Vendor (GitHub_M) PRIMARY
8.2 HIGH
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
vuln.today AI
8.2 HIGH

Network-reachable API requires a valid tenant API key (PR:L), key enumeration introduces genuine complexity (AC:H), and cross-tenant data access constitutes a scope change (S:C) with full read/write payload impact (C:H/I:H) and no availability impact.

3.1 AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
4.0 AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M).

CVSS VectorVendor: GitHub_M

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
High
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

4
Patch available
Aug 13, 2026 - 22:19 EUVD
Source Code Evidence Fetched
Aug 13, 2026 - 22:10 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
Aug 13, 2026 - 22:10 vuln.today
CVE Published
Aug 13, 2026 - 21:16 cve.org
HIGH 8.2

DescriptionCVE.org

Trigger.dev is a platform for building and deploying fully managed AI agents and workflows. From 4.4.2 until 4.5.0-rc.5, Aws4FetchClient.buildUrl() and Aws4FetchClient.presign() in apps/webapp/app/v3/objectStoreClient.server.ts assign user-controlled packet keys to URL.pathname, while apps/webapp/app/routes/api.v1.packets.$.ts accepts params["*"] without rejecting dot segments and uses findResource: async () => 1 without per-resource ownership validation. WHATWG path normalization collapses .. segments before signing, allowing a caller with a valid environment API key to obtain presigned URLs for another tenant's object-store keys and read or overwrite task payloads. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0-rc.5.

AnalysisAI

Cross-tenant path traversal in Trigger.dev versions 4.4.2 through pre-4.5.0-rc.5 allows any authenticated tenant holding a valid environment API key to obtain presigned AWS S3 URLs scoped to another tenant's object-store keys, enabling unauthorized read and write access to task payloads. The flaw combines user-controlled packet path keys written directly into URL.pathname without dot-segment rejection and a stub ownership check (findResource: async () => 1) that unconditionally returns truthy for any requested resource. …

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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata

Recon
Obtain valid tenant environment API key
Delivery
Craft dot-segment traversal packet path targeting victim tenant key
Exploit
Submit path to /api/v1/packets/* endpoint
Install
WHATWG URL normalization collapses traversal before signing
C2
findResource stub approves any key unconditionally
Execute
Server returns cross-tenant presigned S3 URL
Impact
Read or overwrite victim tenant task payloads via S3

Vulnerability AssessmentAI

Exploitation Exploitation requires possession of a valid Trigger.dev environment API key for any tenant on the target instance - the attacker must be an authenticated low-privilege user, not an external unauthenticated actor. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment.
Risk Assessment The CVSS 8.2 score with S:C (scope changed) accurately reflects the real-world severity: a tenant-authenticated attacker in one security domain can cross into another tenant's storage domain, which is a meaningful and directly impactful boundary violation. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in.
Exploit Scenario An attacker holding a valid Trigger.dev environment API key for their own tenant crafts a packet path containing dot-segment traversal sequences - for example ../../victim-project-ref/prod/sensitive-payload-key - and submits it to the /api/v1/packets/* or /api/v2/packets/* endpoint. Because WHATWG URL normalization in URL.pathname collapses the traversal before the request is processed and the findResource stub always returns truthy, the server generates and returns a valid AWS presigned URL scoped to the victim tenant's S3 key. …
Remediation The primary fix is to upgrade to Trigger.dev v4.5.0-rc.5 or later, as documented at https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.0-rc.5 and in security advisory GHSA-888c-px7m-736v. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report.

Recommended ActionAI

Within 24 hours, verify your Trigger.dev version and identify all instances running versions 4.4.2 or later; simultaneously enable enhanced S3 access logging to detect cross-tenant requests. …

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CVE-2026-73658 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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