Trigger.dev CVE-2026-114069

Exploitation requires the attacker to possess a valid but restricted 'read:envvars' scoped API key for the target Trigger.dev instance, and to call the specific GET /api/v1/projects/:projectRef/envvars endpoint against a staging, production, or preview environment (these three environment types are explicitly affected). The limiting factor is this key requirement (PR:L) - it is not anonymous exploitation; an attacker with no credentials at all cannot trigger it. However, the authorization boundary that is supposed to restrict such keys to read-only envvar access fails, so no special or non-default configuration is needed beyond having the scoped key and running a version before 4.6.0.

This is a genuine priority, not a high-CVSS-but-low-real-risk issue. The vendor-assigned CVSS 4.0 score of 8.6 is supported by a coherent vector: network attack vector (AV:N), low complexity (AC:L), no attack requirements (AT:N), no user interaction (UI:N), and only low privileges required (PR:L) - meaning any holder of a legitimately-issued restricted read:envvars key can exploit it. The impact is severe and credible: high confidentiality (VC:H) because the root TRIGGER_SECRET_KEY and plaintext secrets are disclosed, and high integrity (VI:H) because that root key lets the attacker trigger tasks and mint admin public JWTs - a classic privilege escalation (CWE-269) from a scoped token to full control. No EPSS score, CISA KEV listing, or public POC was provided in the input, so exploitation is not confirmed to be occurring in the wild; the risk is driven by severity and ease, not by evidence of mass exploitation. The one tempering factor is the PR:L prerequisite: the attacker must already possess a valid restricted API key, so this is an insider/privilege-boundary-failure scenario or a follow-on from a leaked scoped key rather than fully anonymous internet-wide exploitation. Availability impact is correctly rated none (VA:N).

An attacker (a low-privilege team member, compromised CI pipeline, or holder of a leaked restricted read:envvars API key) calls GET /api/v1/projects/:projectRef/envvars against a staging, production, or preview environment. The endpoint improperly returns the environment's root TRIGGER_SECRET_KEY plus plaintext secrets, which the attacker then uses to trigger arbitrary tasks and mint admin-level public JWTs. No public exploit code was identified in the provided data, but the attack requires only a single standard API request.