EUVD-2026-58390Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:H
Any valid API key suffices (PR:L), request is remote and low-complexity, cross-tenant boundary gives S:C; core impact is integrity (I:H) via injecting a worker, with limited confidentiality/availability effect.
Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M).
CVSS VectorVendor: GitHub_M
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
4DescriptionCVE.org
Trigger.dev is a platform for building and deploying fully managed AI agents and workflows. Prior to 4.5.6, POST /api/v1/deployments/:deploymentId/background-workers calls CreateDeploymentBackgroundWorkerServiceV4.call() in apps/webapp/app/v3/services/createDeploymentBackgroundWorkerV4.server.ts, where workerDeployment.findFirst() selects a deployment by friendlyId without an environmentId predicate. A caller with a valid API key for one project can submit another project's deployment identifier, link an attacker-owned background worker to the victim deployment, and move the victim deployment from BUILDING to DEPLOYING. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.6.
AnalysisAI
Cross-tenant authorization bypass in Trigger.dev before 4.5.6 lets a caller holding a valid API key for one project act on another project's deployment. Because CreateDeploymentBackgroundWorkerServiceV4.call() looks up the deployment by friendlyId with no environmentId/tenant predicate, an attacker can attach an attacker-controlled background worker to a victim project's deployment and force it from BUILDING to DEPLOYING. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Requires a valid Trigger.dev API key for any project (PR:L) - this is authenticated per the CVSS vector, not anonymous. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The signals are mostly consistent toward high priority: the vendor-supplied vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:H yields 9.9, reflecting a network-reachable, low-complexity attack that needs only low privileges (any valid API key) and crosses a tenant boundary (scope change). … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker signs up for or already holds any low-privilege Trigger.dev account and generates a valid API key for their own project. They obtain a victim deployment's friendlyId (guessable/enumerable or leaked) and POST to /api/v1/deployments/:deploymentId/background-workers with that identifier, causing the server to link their attacker-controlled background worker to the victim's deployment and advance it from BUILDING to DEPLOYING. … |
| Remediation | Upgrade to the fixed Trigger.dev release; the description specifies 4.5.6, but because the references cite release v4.5.2 and PR #4199, confirm the exact patched tag against advisory GHSA-j6vv-pq9h-f4wj before deploying (https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-j6vv-pq9h-f4wj, https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4199). … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours: audit all API key usage in Trigger.dev across your organization and identify active keys; review recent deployment logs for unauthorized cross-tenant access attempts; enable API-level logging if not already active. …
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External POC / Exploit Code
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