Intel TDX MigTD CVE-2026-62920

Requires an attacker who already controls privileged system software (hypervisor/ring-0 host) on an Intel TDX-enabled platform and local access to a system where the MigTD component participates in Trust Domain live migration; the attacker drives MigTD into an error condition whose return value is not checked (CWE-252). Limiting factors: PR:H means only an already-privileged host-level adversary can trigger it (not a guest TD user or remote attacker), AV:L means no network reachability, and impact is confined to availability (DoS) with no confidentiality or integrity effect and no user interaction needed. Exploitation is only relevant where TDX with MigTD-based migration is actually enabled and in use.

This is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.0 base 6.7) local denial-of-service issue in Intel TDX's Migration Trust Domain (MigTD) error-handling path (CWE-252, unchecked return value). All signals point to a bounded, low-urgency risk rather than a widespread emergency. The CVSS vector requires local access (AV:L) and high privileges (PR:H) - the Intel advisory text describes a 'system software adversary with a privileged user,' i.e. an actor already at hypervisor/ring-0 level - so the attacker must already hold a strongly privileged position. Impact is confined to availability (VA:H; VC:N/VI:N) with no subsequent-system impact (SC/SI/SA:N), meaning the realistic worst case is crashing/hanging the migration flow, not code execution or data disclosure. No EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public PoC are present in the provided data, and the vuln.today decision label is 'this_month' (not act_now/emergency), consistent with a patch-on-normal-cycle priority. No signals conflict here: high CVSS-for-a-DoS is driven by the high-privilege requirement being normal for the TDX threat model (confidential computing assumes a hostile/privileged host), not by broad exploitability. This is a genuine but lower-priority issue - prioritize for scheduled patching on TDX-enabled confidential-computing hosts, not for emergency response.

An adversary already running privileged system software (e.g. a malicious or compromised hypervisor/host) on a TDX-enabled platform interacts with the MigTD during a Trust Domain migration, driving it into an error condition whose return value MigTD fails to check. The resulting mishandled error state causes a denial of service against the migration/availability of the affected system. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and exploitation requires local access with high privileges, limiting it to actors already inside the host software stack.