Intel MigTD
CVE-2026-57890
HIGH
Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessReach MigTD SPDM responder over network
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DeliverySend crafted SPDM message during TD migration
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ExploitForce exception in responder handling
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ExecutionImproper cleanup leaves confidential data exposed
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ImpactDisclose Trust Domain confidential information
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A10:2025 - Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions
ASVS 5.0
V16 - Security Logging and Error Handling Exception cleanup procedures
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| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation targets the SPDM responder inside MigTD (the Intel TDX Migration Trust Domain), which operates during live migration/attestation of a Trust Domain; the adversary must be able to reach this responder over the network. Per the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N) no authentication, no special attack requirements, no user interaction, and no non-default configuration are stated as necessary. The practical limiting factor is exposure window and surface: the SPDM responder is only an active target where Intel TDX with MigTD is deployed and a Trust Domain migration session is in progress or reachable, confining real-world opportunity to confidential-computing environments rather than general-purpose hosts. The precise message or state that triggers the thrown exception is not described in the available sources. |
| Impact | Signals are largely consistent and point to a genuinely serious but not emergency-grade issue. The Intel-supplied CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H) describes a network-reachable, low-complexity, unauthenticated flaw with no user interaction and high confidentiality impact, scoring 8.7 (High) - a plausibly real-world-exploitable condition on paper. However, the counterbalancing signals temper urgency: there is no CISA KEV listing (not actively exploited), no EPSS score supplied (widespread-exploitation probability unknown), and no public exploit or PoC reference, so no public exploit is identified at time of analysis. The vuln.today decision label is 'this_week', not act_now/emergency, which aligns with a high-severity-but-not-under-attack posture. A key contextual limiter missing from the raw CVSS is deployment surface: MigTD's SPDM responder is only a live, network-reachable target during Trust Domain migration, so the AV:N/PR:N exposure is narrower in practice than the vector alone implies - verify reachability assumptions against the Intel advisory (INTEL-SA-01580), whose full content was not retrieved here. Net: a real patch priority for TDX/confidential-computing operators, but presently a high-CVSS issue without confirmed in-the-wild exploitation rather than an actively exploited crisis. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | During a Trust Domain live migration, a network-positioned adversary interacts with MigTD's SPDM responder and sends a message that forces an exception; because of improper cleanup on that thrown exception (CWE-460), residual confidential memory is exposed back to the attacker. No authentication or user interaction is required per the CVSS vector, and the low attack complexity makes the flaw practical to trigger, though no public exploit code is identified at time of analysis. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Nov 10, 2026
Information disclosure in Intel's TDX Migration Trust Domain (MigTD) lets a network-reachable adversary read data that should stay inside the confidential-computing boundary: the SPDM responder does not properly clean up when an exception is thrown, and per the assessed vector the attacker needs no authentication, no special attack requirements and no user interaction (CVSS 4.0 base 8.7, confidentiality high, integrity and availability none). Real-world exposure is confined to hosts where Intel TDX with MigTD is deployed and the SPDM responder is reachable during a Trust Domain migration or attestation session, rather than general-purpose systems. No public exploit code and no confirmed active exploitation were identified at time of analysis; the vendor (Intel) is the reporting source and the issue is prioritized as a this-week item rather than an emergency.
RemediationAI
Patch status is not confirmed in the available data - no fixed MigTD build number is given here, so the primary action is to pull the corrected MigTD release and any associated TDX platform firmware/software updates documented in Intel security advisory intel-sa-01580 (https://intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01580.html), and to verify the advisory's affected-version matrix against the MigTD builds in use. Because the assessed exploitation path requires the adversary to reach the MigTD SPDM responder over the network during migration or attestation, the practical compensating control is to restrict that surface: keep migration and attestation traffic on a dedicated, tightly segmented network limited to known source/destination host pairs, or disable MigTD-based live migration until the fixed build is deployed. The trade-off is significant - network isolation of the responder must be maintained for every migration path or live migration between hosts will fail, and disabling MigTD migration removes the ability to move Trust Domains at all, so neither substitute for installing the vendor fix.
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Technical ContextAI · show details
MigTD is the Intel TDX Migration Trust Domain, a special Trust Domain that runs on both the source and destination platforms during live migration and performs attestation and key exchange for the migrating TD; its SPDM responder implements the DMTF Security Protocol and Data Model, the protocol used for device authentication and measurement reporting between the endpoints. The root cause maps to CWE-460 (Improper Cleanup on Thrown Exception): the responder's error path does not unwind state correctly when an exception is raised, so the handler can continue in an inconsistent state and expose data that should not be returned to the requester - hence a confidentiality-only impact at high severity with no integrity or availability effect on either the vulnerable component or subsequent systems. The CPE record lists the affected package as Intel(R) TDX Migration Trust Domain (MigTD) with wildcard version fields, indicating the advisory applies across MigTD builds rather than a single pinned release. The trigger is not described in the available sources: neither the exact SPDM message nor the internal state that causes the exception to be thrown is specified, and the CVSS 4.0 metrics (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N) only establish that the path is network-reachable, low complexity and unauthenticated, not the specific malformed or unexpected input involved.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Vector and description state unauthenticated network access with low complexity and no user interaction (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N); impact is confidentiality-only (C:H, I:N, A:N) with no scope change.
Primary rating from Vendor (intel).
CVSS VectorVendor: intel
DescriptionCVE.org
Improper cleanup on thrown exception in the MigTD's SPDM responder for the Intel(R) TDX Migration Trust Domain (MigTD) within Ring 0: Hypervisor may allow an information disclosure. Network adversary with an unauthenticated user combined with a low complexity attack may enable data exposure. This result may potentially occur via network access when attack requirements are not present without special internal knowledge and requires no user interaction. The potential vulnerability may impact the confidentiality (high), integrity (none) and availability (none) of the vulnerable system, resulting in subsequent system confidentiality (none), integrity (none) and availability (none) impacts.
Executive ViewAI
A high-severity information disclosure flaw in Intel's TDX Migration Trust Domain (MigTD) could allow an unauthenticated network attacker to read sensitive data within confidential-computing boundaries. This affects only organizations using Intel TDX with MigTD in production, potentially exposing confidential workloads and undermining trust in secure enclaves. Leadership should prioritize remediation within the week, as the vulnerability erodes the confidentiality guarantees critical for regulated or sensitive data processing.
Restrict network access to the SPDM responder to trusted management networks only; monitor for unusual SPDM or migration traffic; consider disabling MigTD if not operationally required; isolate affected hosts from untrusted networks.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Information disclosure occurs when an application unintentionally exposes sensitive data that aids attackers in reconnaissance or directly compromises security.
Affected Products (CPE)CVE.org
Missing authentication in the Intel TDX Migration Trust Domain (MigTD) SPDM rebind path allows an unauthenticated attack
Authentication bypass in the Intel TDX Migration Trust Domain (MigTD) rebinding protocol allows a privileged local adver
Capture-replay authentication bypass in Intel TDX Migration Trust Domain (MigTD) lets a local, highly privileged system-
Insufficient access-control granularity in the MigTD v2 policy evaluation engine within Intel TDX's Migration Trust Doma
Privilege escalation and information disclosure in Intel TDX MigTD stem from an expired-pointer dereference in the virti
Write-what-where in the Intel TDX Migration Trust Domain (MigTD) lets a privileged local adversary who already holds Rin
Privilege escalation in Intel TDX's Migration Trust Domain (MigTD) allows an adversary who already controls the Ring 0 h
Privilege escalation in the Intel TDX Migration Trust Domain (MigTD) signing path allows a privileged local system-softw
A denial-of-service condition exists in Intel's TDX Migration Trust Domain (MigTD), where the GetQuote routine contains
Use-after-free in the MigTD virtio driver, a Ring 0 component of the Intel TDX Migration Trust Domain used during trust-
Local information disclosure in Intel MigTD, the Intel TDX Migration Trust Domain component operating in the Ring 0/hype
Integrity-only privilege escalation in the SPDM responder of Intel's TDX Migration Trust Domain (MigTD), caused by incom
NVD
CVE.org
GitHub PoC
Exploit-DB