Intel TDX MigTD CVE-2026-57892

Exploitation requires the target to be running the Intel TDX Migration Trust Domain (MigTD) v2 with its policy evaluation engine active - i.e., an Intel TDX confidential-computing deployment using TD migration. The attacker must be on an adjacent network (AV:A), not the open internet, so network positioning on the same logical segment/broadcast domain as the host is a hard prerequisite. No authentication (PR:N) and no user interaction (UI:N) are needed, but the attack is high-complexity (AC:H), meaning the trigger is non-trivial; the specific mechanism of the insufficient-granularity flaw is not described in the available sources. Limiting factors: adjacency requirement, high attack complexity, and the narrow population of hosts actually running MigTD v2.

This is a genuine but conditional priority rather than a drop-everything emergency. The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N) scores 8.8 and describes an unauthenticated adjacent-network attacker needing a high-complexity attack path to escalate privilege within the MigTD, with a confirmed scope change into the subsequent system (VC:H/VI:H and SC:H/SI:H). The vuln.today decision label is 'this_week', which aligns with a serious-but-not-active rating. No EPSS score, CISA KEV listing, or POC/exploit reference is present in the input, so there is no evidence of active exploitation or public exploit code. The main tension is between high impact (confidentiality and integrity high on both the vulnerable and subsequent systems) and real-world difficulty: AC:H plus adjacent-only access (AV:A, not AV:N) materially constrains who can reach the target. Net: treat as a prioritized patch for environments running Intel TDX confidential computing with MigTD, but the adjacency requirement and high attack complexity reduce the likelihood of widespread opportunistic exploitation versus targeted attacks against confidential-computing infrastructure.

An attacker positioned on the same adjacent network segment as the confidential-computing host sends crafted traffic that exploits insufficient granularity in the MigTD v2 policy evaluation engine, causing the policy check to under-restrict an action and yielding privilege escalation that breaches the confidentiality and integrity of the Trust Domain migration path. The attack requires no authentication and no user interaction but is high-complexity (AC:H), implying a non-trivial, carefully engineered trigger. No public exploit identified at time of analysis.