Dragonfly EUVD-2026-98775

Requires a Dragonfly instance earlier than 1.40 running in its default configuration with authentication disabled (no requirepass/ACL), and network reachability to the Dragonfly client port so the attacker can issue a RESTORE command. The concrete trigger is a crafted DUMP/serialized stream payload containing a consumer group whose global PEL entry is claimed by two consumers (or by none), handled in OpaqueObjLoader::CreateStream. Limiting factors that reduce real-world exposure: if authentication is enabled (requirepass or ACLs configured), the attacker must first possess valid credentials; the instance must be network-exposed to the attacker; and only versions before the 1.40 fix are affected. No user interaction is needed.

Multiple signals converge on genuinely high risk, but with important caveats. The CWE-415 double-free is confirmed by a vendor GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA-cg35-6jf4-crfh) and a fix PR (#7929) with a regression test, so the vulnerability itself is well-substantiated. The input CVSS of 9.6 uses AV:A (adjacent) with PR:N, meaning unauthenticated and low-complexity - consistent with the description's claim that Dragonfly ships with authentication disabled by default, so any client able to reach the port can issue RESTORE. However, there is a notable discrepancy: the description describes a networked data-store command (RESTORE) reachable over Dragonfly's normal client protocol, which argues for AV:N rather than AV:A - verify the intended exposure with the vendor, as AV:N would push the score higher. No EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public exploit were provided; per the precision rules this is 'no public exploit identified at time of analysis.' The fix PR includes a proof-of-corruption test (RestoreStreamConsumerGroupCorruption) that reliably triggers the condition, which lowers the bar for weaponization even though it is not itself an exploit. The real-world impact ranges from reliable denial of service (allocator corruption is a dependable crash) to potential remote code execution as the Dragonfly service account, the latter being harder and not demonstrated. Net: this is a real priority for internet- or untrusted-network-exposed Dragonfly instances running the default auth-disabled configuration, not merely a high-CVSS-but-low-real-risk issue - but the absence of EPSS/KEV/POC signals means there is no evidence of active exploitation yet.

An attacker with network reachability to a default-configured Dragonfly instance (authentication disabled) connects and issues a RESTORE command carrying a crafted serialized stream whose consumer group has a global PEL entry claimed by two consumers (or left unclaimed). The malformed stream causes one streamNACK to be shared and freed twice during cleanup, corrupting the allocator and crashing the service, with a realistic path to code execution as the Dragonfly service account. No public exploit is identified, but the vendor's own regression test deterministically reproduces the corruption, making the trigger well-understood.