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Contracts Wizard EUVDEUVD-2026-77702

| CVE-2026-57583 LOW
Code Injection (CWE-94)
2026-09-14 GitHub_M
3.3
CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: GitHub_M

Severity by source

Vendor (GitHub_M) PRIMARY
3.3 LOW
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M) · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorVendor: GitHub_M

Attack Vector
Local
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Source Code Evidence Fetched
Sep 15, 2026 - 11:35 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
Sep 15, 2026 - 11:35 vuln.today
Patch available
Sep 14, 2026 - 19:03 EUVD

Blast Radius

ecosystem impact
† from your stack dependencies † transitive graph · vuln.today resolves 4-path depth
  • 2 npm packages depend on @openzeppelin/wizard-cairo (2 direct, 0 indirect)
  • 2 npm packages depend on @openzeppelin/wizard-stylus (2 direct, 0 indirect)

Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 3.0.1 and other introduced versions.

DescriptionCVE.org

OpenZeppelin Contracts Wizard is a web application to interactively build a contract out of components from OpenZeppelin Contracts. Prior to @openzeppelin/wizard 0.10.11, @openzeppelin/wizard-cairo 3.0.1, @openzeppelin/wizard-stellar 0.6.2, and @openzeppelin/wizard-stylus 0.3.1, the setInfo code path prints info.securityContact and info.license verbatim into single-line comments in generated Solidity, Cairo, Stellar/Soroban, and Stylus source. A line terminator ends the comment and causes following input to be emitted as source declarations. Exploitation requires an integration to populate these fields from untrusted input and a user to consume the generated source; normal self-service web, AI assistant, CLI, and self-hosted API use does not cross that trust boundary, shared links cannot set the fields, and no code executes on a Wizard service. This issue affects generated-source integrity only and is fixed in versions 0.10.11, 3.0.1, 0.6.2, and 0.3.1 of the respective packages.

AnalysisAI

Comment-injection in the OpenZeppelin Contracts Wizard code generators lets a newline character embedded in the info.securityContact or info.license option break out of the single-line // comment and be emitted as live source declarations in generated Solidity, Cairo, Stellar/Soroban, and Stylus contracts. Only integrations that populate those two fields from untrusted input and then hand the generated source to a downstream consumer are affected — the self-service web app, AI assistant, CLI, and self-hosted API all use user-supplied values and never cross that trust boundary, and shared links cannot set the fields. …

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EUVD-2026-77702 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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