Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A05:2025 - Injection
ASVS 5.0
V1 - Encoding and Sanitization Code injection prevention, sandbox exec
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Execution, Initial Access The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Sep 15, 2026
Comment-injection in the OpenZeppelin Contracts Wizard code generators lets a newline character embedded in the info.securityContact or info.license option break out of the single-line // comment and be emitted as live source declarations in generated Solidity, Cairo, Stellar/Soroban, and Stylus contracts. Only integrations that populate those two fields from untrusted input and then hand the generated source to a downstream consumer are affected — the self-service web app, AI assistant, CLI, and self-hosted API all use user-supplied values and never cross that trust boundary, and shared links cannot set the fields. The flaw is integrity-only (CVSS 3.3, CWE-94): no code executes on any Wizard service, no public exploit is identified in the supplied data, and patched packages are available as @openzeppelin/wizard 0.10.11, wizard-cairo 3.0.1, wizard-stellar 0.6.2, and wizard-stylus 0.3.1.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 9 packages in npm, euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
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- Exploit and PoC references, threat intelligence from 22 sources
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Severity by source
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M) · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorVendor: GitHub_M
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionCVE.org
OpenZeppelin Contracts Wizard is a web application to interactively build a contract out of components from OpenZeppelin Contracts. Prior to @openzeppelin/wizard 0.10.11, @openzeppelin/wizard-cairo 3.0.1, @openzeppelin/wizard-stellar 0.6.2, and @openzeppelin/wizard-stylus 0.3.1, the setInfo code path prints info.securityContact and info.license verbatim into single-line comments in generated Solidity, Cairo, Stellar/Soroban, and Stylus source. A line terminator ends the comment and causes following input to be emitted as source declarations. Exploitation requires an integration to populate these fields from untrusted input and a user to consume the generated source; normal self-service web, AI assistant, CLI, and self-hosted API use does not cross that trust boundary, shared links cannot set the fields, and no code executes on a Wizard service. This issue affects generated-source integrity only and is fixed in versions 0.10.11, 3.0.1, 0.6.2, and 0.3.1 of the respective packages.
Blast Radius
ecosystem impact- 2 npm packages depend on @openzeppelin/wizard-cairo (2 direct, 0 indirect)
- 2 npm packages depend on @openzeppelin/wizard-stylus (2 direct, 0 indirect)
Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 3.0.1 and other introduced versions.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Code injection occurs when an application accepts user input and passes it directly into a language interpreter or evaluator without proper sanitization.
Remote Code Execution represents the critical moment when an attacker successfully runs arbitrary code on a target system without physical access.
EUVD-2026-77702
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
GitHub
VulDB
Exploit-DB