Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A05:2025 - Injection
ASVS 5.0
V1 - Encoding and Sanitization Code injection prevention, sandbox exec
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Execution, Initial Access The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Sep 15, 2026
Comment-injection in the OpenZeppelin Contracts Wizard code generators lets a newline character embedded in the info.securityContact or info.license option break out of the single-line // comment and be emitted as live source declarations in generated Solidity, Cairo, Stellar/Soroban, and Stylus contracts. Only integrations that populate those two fields from untrusted input and then hand the generated source to a downstream consumer are affected — the self-service web app, AI assistant, CLI, and self-hosted API all use user-supplied values and never cross that trust boundary, and shared links cannot set the fields. The flaw is integrity-only (CVSS 3.3, CWE-94): no code executes on any Wizard service, no public exploit is identified in the supplied data, and patched packages are available as @openzeppelin/wizard 0.10.11, wizard-cairo 3.0.1, wizard-stellar 0.6.2, and wizard-stylus 0.3.1.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 9 packages in npm, euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
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- Exploit and PoC references, threat intelligence from 22 sources
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Severity by source
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M) · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorVendor: GitHub_M
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionCVE.org
OpenZeppelin Contracts Wizard is a web application to interactively build a contract out of components from OpenZeppelin Contracts. Prior to @openzeppelin/wizard 0.10.11, @openzeppelin/wizard-cairo 3.0.1, @openzeppelin/wizard-stellar 0.6.2, and @openzeppelin/wizard-stylus 0.3.1, the setInfo code path prints info.securityContact and info.license verbatim into single-line comments in generated Solidity, Cairo, Stellar/Soroban, and Stylus source. A line terminator ends the comment and causes following input to be emitted as source declarations. Exploitation requires an integration to populate these fields from untrusted input and a user to consume the generated source; normal self-service web, AI assistant, CLI, and self-hosted API use does not cross that trust boundary, shared links cannot set the fields, and no code executes on a Wizard service. This issue affects generated-source integrity only and is fixed in versions 0.10.11, 3.0.1, 0.6.2, and 0.3.1 of the respective packages.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Code injection occurs when an application accepts user input and passes it directly into a language interpreter or evaluator without proper sanitization.
Remote Code Execution represents the critical moment when an attacker successfully runs arbitrary code on a target system without physical access.
EUVD-2026-77702
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
GitHub
VulDB
Exploit-DB