Wizard Cairo
Monthly
Comment-injection in the OpenZeppelin Contracts Wizard code generators lets a newline character embedded in the `info.securityContact` or `info.license` option break out of the single-line `//` comment and be emitted as live source declarations in generated Solidity, Cairo, Stellar/Soroban, and Stylus contracts. Only integrations that populate those two fields from untrusted input and then hand the generated source to a downstream consumer are affected — the self-service web app, AI assistant, CLI, and self-hosted API all use user-supplied values and never cross that trust boundary, and shared links cannot set the fields. The flaw is integrity-only (CVSS 3.3, CWE-94): no code executes on any Wizard service, no public exploit is identified in the supplied data, and patched packages are available as @openzeppelin/wizard 0.10.11, wizard-cairo 3.0.1, wizard-stellar 0.6.2, and wizard-stylus 0.3.1.
Comment-injection in the OpenZeppelin Contracts Wizard code generators lets a newline character embedded in the `info.securityContact` or `info.license` option break out of the single-line `//` comment and be emitted as live source declarations in generated Solidity, Cairo, Stellar/Soroban, and Stylus contracts. Only integrations that populate those two fields from untrusted input and then hand the generated source to a downstream consumer are affected — the self-service web app, AI assistant, CLI, and self-hosted API all use user-supplied values and never cross that trust boundary, and shared links cannot set the fields. The flaw is integrity-only (CVSS 3.3, CWE-94): no code executes on any Wizard service, no public exploit is identified in the supplied data, and patched packages are available as @openzeppelin/wizard 0.10.11, wizard-cairo 3.0.1, wizard-stellar 0.6.2, and wizard-stylus 0.3.1.