Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessGain local low-privileged shell
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DeliveryLocate installed PassMark product with DirectIo64.sys
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ExploitOpen device handle to DirectIo64.sys
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ExecutionIssue IOCTL with attacker-controlled output path
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PersistDriver maps all physical RAM in SYSTEM context
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ImpactParse dump to extract LSASS credentials and crypto keys
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A06:2025 - Insecure Design
ASVS 5.0
V5 - File Handling File name/path control
|
| Exploitation Conditions | Any local user-mode process with sufficient privilege to open a handle to the DirectIo64.sys device object can trigger the vulnerability - no administrative rights are required, only local code execution. The driver must be present on the system, which is the case whenever PerformanceTest, BurnInTest, or OSForensics is installed in a version prior to the fixed builds. The attack requires only a single IOCTL call with a caller-controlled file path; no prior authentication to the PassMark application is needed, and no special runtime configuration of the software must be active. Exploitation is limited to Windows (the driver is Windows-only), requires physical or remote-shell access to the target machine, and does not function if the PassMark driver is not loaded (e.g., if the software has not been launched since last reboot and the driver is set to manual start). The write destination is constrained only by filesystem reachability in SYSTEM context, meaning attacker-specified paths that low-privileged user ACLs would normally reject are accessible. |
| Impact | The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H) scores 8.5, reflecting a local, low-complexity, low-privilege exploit with high CIA impact on the vulnerable system. The primary real-world risk is credential theft: the attack pattern directly targets LSASS working-set memory and in-use cryptographic material, making it highly relevant as a lateral-movement enabler or credential-harvesting step following initial access. The arbitrary SYSTEM-context write (VI:H) is also significant and could overwrite critical system files, though VA:H in the supplied vector may overstate availability impact - causing a BSOD is possible but incidental and not the stated attacker objective. EPSS data was not supplied in the input; however, the combination of a public POC (GitHub, VulnCheck advisory, technical blog post at dkom.dev) and broad deployment across performance-testing and forensics workstations elevates practical risk above base-score CVSS alone would suggest. No CISA KEV listing indicates no confirmed widespread exploitation at time of analysis. The exploit is fully described and the PoC is mature, meaning the barrier to weaponization is low for any attacker already holding local access. Defenders should treat this as a high-priority post-exploitation tool in red-team chains targeting credential extraction. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker with a low-privileged Windows account on a workstation where any PassMark product is installed opens a handle to DirectIo64.sys and issues a single crafted IOCTL call specifying an attacker-writable output path. The driver, running as SYSTEM, silently enumerates all physical RAM pages and writes a raw memory image to the specified file - a GitHub proof-of-concept demonstrates this end-to-end. The attacker then parses the dump offline using standard tools (e.g., Volatility) to extract NTLM hashes, Kerberos tickets, and plaintext credentials from the LSASS working set for lateral movement across the environment. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Sep 04, 2026
Full physical memory disclosure in PassMark's shared kernel driver DirectIo64.sys affects PerformanceTest (before 11.1 build 1012), BurnInTest (before 11.1 build 1000), and OSForensics (before 11.1 build 1016) on Windows. A low-privileged local attacker can issue a single IOCTL call supplying an attacker-controlled output path, causing the driver to enumerate all physical memory ranges via MmGetPhysicalMemoryRanges and map each page through ZwMapViewOfSection on the PhysicalMemory section object, writing a complete RAM image to disk in SYSTEM context and bypassing user-mode ACLs. Exposed data includes LSASS working-set memory, per-process heap contents, and in-use cryptographic keying material from all running processes. A public proof-of-concept is available at GitHub and no active exploitation (KEV) has been confirmed at time of analysis.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patches are confirmed: upgrade PassMark PerformanceTest to 11.1 build 1012 or later, BurnInTest to 11.1 build 1000 or later, and OSForensics to 11.1 build 1016 or later. Patch history pages are published at https://www.passmark.com/products/performancetest/history.php, https://www.passmark.com/products/burnintest/history.php, and https://www.osforensics.com/whats-new.html. For systems where immediate patching is not feasible, a targeted compensating control is to restrict access to the DirectIo64.sys device object using a Windows kernel driver ACL policy (e.g., via a Group Policy or WDAC/AppLocker rule that prevents non-administrative processes from opening the device handle); this blocks low-privileged IOCTL callers but does not fully remediate the underlying design flaw and may interfere with PassMark's own benchmarking functions that depend on the driver. If the PassMark software suite is not actively required, uninstalling it and removing DirectIo64.sys from the system eliminates the attack surface entirely without side effects.
Affected VersionsENISA
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Technical ContextAI · show details
The vulnerable component is the Windows kernel driver DirectIo64.sys, which is bundled with all three PassMark products (CPE: cpe:2.3:a:passmark_software:performancetest:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*, cpe:2.3:a:passmark_software:burnintest:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*, cpe:2.3:a:passmark_software:osforensics:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*). The driver exposes a device interface reachable by low-privileged user-mode processes via DeviceIoControl. The root cause is CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path): the driver accepts an attacker-supplied file path parameter from the IOCTL input buffer without restriction and uses it as the destination for the memory dump it writes in SYSTEM context. Internally, the driver leverages the Windows kernel API MmGetPhysicalMemoryRanges to enumerate all physical memory descriptors, then calls ZwMapViewOfSection on the well-known \Device\PhysicalMemory section object to map each physical page into kernel address space, writing the full RAM image to the caller-controlled path. Because the write occurs at SYSTEM privilege, it bypasses discretionary access control on the target file path, enabling an attacker to place the dump at locations that user-mode processes would normally be denied write access to.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Low-privileged local IOCTL trigger with scope change to SYSTEM context gives C:H (full RAM dump) and I:H (arbitrary SYSTEM-context write); availability impact is incidental and not a reliable attacker outcome.
Primary rating from Vendor (VulnCheck).
CVSS VectorVendor: VulnCheck
DescriptionCVE.org
PassMark PerformanceTest before 11.1 build 1012, BurnInTest before 11.1 build 1000, and OSForensics before 11.1 build 1016 contain an information disclosure vulnerability in DirectIo64.sys that allows unauthenticated local attackers to dump complete physical memory contents by supplying a caller-controlled file path to an exposed IOCTL. Attackers can issue a single IOCTL call to trigger the driver to iterate all physical memory ranges via MmGetPhysicalMemoryRanges and map each page through ZwMapViewOfSection on the PhysicalMemory section object, writing a full RAM image to an attacker-specified path in the SYSTEM context, bypassing user-mode ACLs and exposing LSASS working set, process memory, and cryptographic material from all running processes.
Technical POC Analysis
CVE-2026-80119 corresponds to Finding 9 in the DirectIo64.sys bug set: a full physical RAM dump to attacker-controlled file via IOCTL 0x8011E084, handled by FUN1400028b4.
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Latest POC
1 PoC candidate from github (unverified)
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Executive ViewAI
PassMark's DirectIo64.sys kernel driver in Windows-based PerformanceTest, BurnInTest, and OSForensics allows any low-privileged local user to extract complete system memory, exposing cryptographic keys, passwords, and sensitive data from all processes. Organizations running these tools risk compromise of their most sensitive credentials if any untrusted user gains local access. Publicly available exploit code exists; immediate patching is mandatory.
Apply vendor patch (PerformanceTest 11.1 build 1012+, BurnInTest 11.1 build 1000+, OSForensics 11.1 build 1016+).
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Information disclosure occurs when an application unintentionally exposes sensitive data that aids attackers in reconnaissance or directly compromises security.
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EUVD-2026-71690
GHSA-gqcv-f465-78vf
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
Exploit-DB