Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessReach charger TCP port 9002
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DeliverySend crafted request to /test endpoint
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ExploitDevice downloads attacker-controlled files
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ExecutionExtract and execute payload as root
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ImpactFull device takeover and network pivot
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A05:2025 - Injection
ASVS 5.0
V1 - Encoding and Sanitization Code injection prevention, sandbox exec
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Execution, Initial Access The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires network reachability to the service listening on TCP port 9002 and the ability to send a crafted request to its /test endpoint; no authentication (PR:N), no user interaction (UI:N), and no special attack requirements (AT:N) are needed against affected firmware (through V1.03.51). The primary limiting factor is network exposure of port 9002 - if that service is not reachable by the attacker (blocked at a firewall or isolated on a segmented network), exploitation is prevented. The attacker must also be able to host or reference files the device will fetch and execute, so outbound network access from the charger to attacker-controlled infrastructure is part of the required chain. |
| Impact | This is a genuine top-priority issue, not an inflated high-CVSS number. The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N with high impact to both the vulnerable system VC/VI/VA and subsequent systems SC/SI/SA) describes network-reachable, low-complexity, unauthenticated exploitation with no user interaction - the maximum-severity profile, scoring 10.0. Publicly available exploit code from CyberDanube sharply lowers the barrier to real-world attacks. Tempering the urgency: no EPSS score was provided in the input, and the CVE is not listed in CISA KEV, so there is no confirmation of active in-the-wild exploitation at time of analysis - POC availability and active exploitation are distinct signals. Real exposure hinges on network reachability of port 9002: chargers exposed to the internet or an untrusted LAN face severe risk, while units behind strict segmentation face materially reduced practical risk. No signals conflict - the description (unauthenticated network RCE) is fully consistent with the AV:N/PR:N vector. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker who can reach a charger's TCP port 9002 - an internet-exposed unit or a malicious host on the same network - sends a crafted request to the /test endpoint referencing an attacker-hosted payload. The charger downloads, extracts, and executes that payload as root, and because public exploit code exists, the attacker gains full device control to disrupt charging, pivot into the network, or conscript the unit into a botnet with minimal effort. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Jul 21, 2026
Remote code execution in Autel MaxiCharger Single EV charging stations (firmware through V1.03.51) lets unauthenticated attackers run arbitrary code as root by sending a crafted request to the /test endpoint of a service listening on TCP port 9002. The flawed handler fetches, extracts, and executes attacker-supplied files, yielding full device takeover with no authentication or user interaction. Publicly available exploit code exists (published by CyberDanube) and the CVSS 4.0 score is 10.0; the vulnerability is not currently listed in CISA KEV.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis, and no fixed firmware version appears in the input data, so operators should contact Autel and monitor for a firmware release superseding V1.03.51. As immediate compensating controls, block or firewall inbound access to TCP port 9002 on every charger and restrict device management to a trusted, segmented VLAN or VPN so the service is unreachable from the internet and general LAN clients - this directly removes the network path to the vulnerable /test handler with minimal operational impact, since port 9002 is not a customer-facing charging function. Where possible, front the chargers with a gateway that permits only required OCPP/charging traffic and drops all other ports, and monitor for unexpected outbound file downloads from chargers (a hallmark of successful exploitation). Review the CyberDanube writeup (https://cyberdanube.com/security-research/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-autel-maxi-charger/) for related issues on the same hardware. Trade-off: aggressive filtering may disrupt legitimate remote-management or diagnostic tooling that relies on device services, so validate before broad rollout.
Affected VersionsENISA
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Technical ContextAI · show details
The affected component is the Autel MaxiCharger Single, a networked electric-vehicle charging station (EVSE) running embedded Linux firmware. A background network service bound to TCP port 9002 exposes a /test endpoint that, by design or misconfiguration, triggers a download-extract-execute workflow driven by attacker-supplied input. This maps to CWE-94 (Improper Control of Generation of Code / Code Injection): externally supplied data is incorporated into an executable code path without validation, so the attacker controls which files are retrieved and run. Because the service executes with root privileges, injected code inherits full control of the device. The single in-scope CPE, cpe:2.3:a:autel:maxicharger_single, identifies the product line, with all firmware versions up to and including V1.03.51 affected.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Unauthenticated network-reachable RCE with no user interaction (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N); root execution with impact beyond the service justifies S:C and full C/I/A loss.
Primary rating from Vendor (CyberDanube).
CVSS VectorVendor: CyberDanube
DescriptionCVE.org
Autel Maxi Charger Single firmware through V1.03.51 allows unauthenticated remote code execution via the service listening on TCP port 9002. A crafted request to the /test endpoint can cause the device to download, extract, and execute attacker-controlled files with root privileges.
Executive ViewAI
Autel MaxiCharger Single EV charging stations (firmware through V1.03.51) contain a critical remote code execution vulnerability allowing unauthenticated attackers to achieve full device compromise; publicly available exploit code exists. Organizations operating this equipment face immediate risk of charging infrastructure disruption and potential network lateral movement from compromised stations. No vendor patch currently exists, creating urgent demand for interim protective measures.
Network isolation of affected devices from external access; disable port 9002 service if operationally feasible; implement network segmentation between charging infrastructure and internal networks; deploy intrusion detection signatures for /test endpoint requests; enable comprehensive logging and real-time alerting on any port 9002 access attempts; restrict administrative access to charging station management interfaces.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Code injection occurs when an application accepts user input and passes it directly into a language interpreter or evaluator without proper sanitization.
Remote Code Execution represents the critical moment when an attacker successfully runs arbitrary code on a target system without physical access.
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EUVD-2026-46637
GHSA-9qpp-vgrg-5mhj
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
VulDB
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