EUVD-2026-67062
GHSA-q473-r68q-32vq
Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
PR:N since planting a contact needs no victim credentials, but AC:H because exploitation hinges on a colliding entry plus the victim later deleting the own identity; C/I:H from key substitution, A:N as availability is unaffected.
Primary rating from Vendor (VulnCheck).
CVSS VectorVendor: VulnCheck
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
openssl_encrypt before 1.4.9 fails to prevent namespace collisions between own identities and contacts in IdentityStore, allowing attackers to create shadowed contact entries invisible until the corresponding own identity is deleted. When the own identity is deleted, the shadowed contact becomes visible and resolves to the attacker's keys, enabling silent key substitution for encrypted files.
AnalysisAI
Silent cryptographic key substitution in jahlives openssl_encrypt before 1.4.9 lets attackers register 'shadow' contact entries in the IdentityStore whose namespace collides with a user's own identity, staying hidden until that own identity is deleted. Once the own identity is removed, the attacker-controlled contact surfaces and resolves to the attacker's keys, so files subsequently encrypted for that identity are protected with keys the attacker holds. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires two concrete conditions drawn from the description: (1) the attacker must be able to create a contact entry in the target's IdentityStore whose namespace collides with an existing own identity (identity shadowing), and (2) the corresponding own identity must subsequently be deleted, which is the event that makes the shadowed contact resolve to the attacker's keys. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The supplied CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H, 9.3) rates this as network-reachable and unauthenticated with high impact across all three dimensions, but the description reveals meaningful preconditions that temper raw severity: the attacker must first get a colliding contact entry into the victim's IdentityStore, and exploitation only 'fires' when the victim later deletes the matching own identity - a specific, victim-driven event rather than an at-will attacker action. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker submits or otherwise injects a contact into the victim's IdentityStore whose namespace identifier deliberately collides with one of the victim's own identities; the entry stays invisible because the own identity takes precedence. Later, when the victim retires or deletes that own identity, the shadowed contact becomes the active resolution and points at the attacker's key, so every file the victim now encrypts for that identity is silently encrypted to the attacker. … |
| Remediation | Upgrade to openssl_encrypt 1.4.9 or later, which is the vendor-released fix that enforces namespace separation between own identities and contacts (Vendor-released patch: 1.4.9; see GHSA-8gmx-w9m8-vx7q). … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours, conduct an immediate inventory of all systems and applications using jahlives openssl_encrypt, document their versions, and prioritize production environments handling sensitive data. …
Sign in for detailed remediation steps and compensating controls.
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External POC / Exploit Code
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