n8n CVE-2026-72767

Exploitation requires a valid n8n account with workflow creation and execution permissions (authenticated, low-privilege). The Git node must be enabled - this is the default configuration; administrators who have explicitly added n8n-nodes-base.git to NODES_EXCLUDE are not affected. The attacker must be able to supply or control a crafted local repository path that is accessible from the n8n host's filesystem or a mounted network share; the repository must contain malicious git hook scripts. Default git security settings (no --no-hooks flag, no core.hooksPath override) must be in place on the n8n host, which is the out-of-box state for standard git installations. Exploitation is bounded by: (1) the requirement for an authenticated account with specific workflow permissions - anonymous users cannot exploit this; (2) read-only n8n accounts are not affected; (3) the crafted repository must be reachable from the n8n host, which may require prior filesystem access or a misconfigured network share in some deployments.

The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H) is well-calibrated to the actual risk: network-accessible, low complexity, no specific attack prerequisites, requiring only a low-privileged authenticated account. The PR:L requirement is the primary limiting gate - unauthenticated exploitation is not possible. However, in any deployment where untrusted users or contractors hold n8n accounts with workflow execution rights (common in automation-heavy teams), this gate provides minimal protection. The vendor confirms both self-hosted and cloud instances are affected, which substantially broadens the attack surface. No KEV listing and no public POC have been identified, which reduces the probability of opportunistic mass exploitation in the short term, but the attack path is clearly described in the advisory and reproducible by any competent attacker. EPSS data was not provided; inferred exploitation probability is moderate given the low-complexity, network-accessible path. This should be treated as a high-priority patch - not a theoretical risk - for environments with mixed-trust user populations.

An authenticated n8n user with workflow creation rights builds a workflow using the Git node, directing it at a locally accessible repository they control - one containing a malicious git hook such as a post-checkout script. When the workflow executes, the n8n Git node invokes git against that repository under default settings; git runs the hook, executing the attacker's payload (e.g., a reverse shell, credential harvesting script, or lateral movement command) as the n8n process user. No public POC has been identified at time of analysis, but the attack path is fully described in the vendor advisory and requires no specialized tooling.