n8n CVE-2025-65964

Requires an authenticated actor with permission to create or modify an n8n workflow that uses the Git node, and specifically the ability to invoke the Add Config operation to write arbitrary Git configuration (notably core.hooksPath) pointing at an attacker-controlled hook such as pre-commit; code execution then fires only when a subsequent Git operation is performed. Exploitation is NOT possible against the patched default behavior in 1.119.2+, which forces core.hooksPath=/dev/null unless the operator explicitly sets N8N_GIT_NODE_ENABLE_HOOKS=true. Limiting factors: workflow-authoring privileges are needed (not anonymous), the Git node must be enabled (it can be excluded as a workaround), and interacting with untrusted repositories materially increases risk.

This is a genuine high-priority vulnerability, though the signals are mixed. The CVSS 4.0 base score of 9.4 is well-supported: network attack vector (AV:N), low complexity (AC:L), no user interaction (UI:N), and full high impact to both the vulnerable system and subsequent systems (VC/VI/VA:H, SC/SI/SA:H) reflect a true remote-code-execution outcome on the n8n host. The one meaningful limiter is PR:L - exploitation requires an authenticated principal able to create or modify a workflow that uses the Git node, so this is not an anonymous internet-facing RCE. Supporting intelligence: a public exploit/PoC is referenced via the GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA-wpqc-h9wp-chmq), and a vendor patch (1.119.2) is confirmed. However, EPSS is only 0.66% (51st percentile) - low-to-moderate - and the CVE is NOT listed in CISA KEV, so there is no evidence of widespread or confirmed active exploitation at time of analysis. The combination of publicly available exploit code plus a low EPSS and no KEV listing suggests capability exists but mass exploitation has not materialized, consistent with the authenticated precondition narrowing the viable attacker population. Net: treat as a real priority for any environment where untrusted or lower-trust users can author/edit Git-node workflows, but the PR:L requirement meaningfully reduces exposure versus a pure unauthenticated RCE.

An attacker with the ability to create or edit an n8n workflow uses the Git node's Add Config operation to set core.hooksPath to a directory (e.g., inside a cloned repo) containing a malicious pre-commit hook; a subsequent Git operation causes Git to execute that hook as a local system command, yielding arbitrary command execution on the n8n host. A public PoC/exploit is referenced in the vendor's GitHub Security Advisory, lowering the skill barrier for abuse.