NVIDIA PhysX CVE-2026-47486

Exploitation requires local processing of attacker-controlled input: per AV:L the attacker has no network path, and per UI:R a legitimate user must actively load or open the malicious PhysX content (e.g., a crafted physics asset, mesh, or serialized scene) in an application using the affected PhysX library (versions 0.0 through 0.4.1.2). The limiting factors are therefore the mandatory user interaction and the local attack vector - the attacker must first get the malicious file to the victim and the victim must open it; there is no unauthenticated remote trigger. No special product configuration setting is identified in the available sources as a precondition; the exact feature or file format that triggers the out-of-bounds write is not described in the provided data. PR:N indicates no attacker authentication is required against the target.

The CVSS 3.1 vector (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, base 7.8) describes a locally-exploitable out-of-bounds write (CWE-787) that requires victim interaction, not a remotely-reachable flaw: AV:L plus UI:R means an attacker cannot reach it over a network and must induce a user to open or process attacker-controlled content with PhysX. The high impact triple (C:H/I:H/A:H) reflects the vendor's statement that exploitation 'might lead to code execution, data tampering, denial of service, information disclosure' - note the vendor uses conditional 'might,' so a single exploit achieving all four outcomes is not asserted. The vuln.today Decision label is 'this_week' (an elevated-but-not-emergency priority), and there is NO CISA KEV listing, NO EPSS score, and NO SSVC decision content in the provided data, so active-exploitation and probability signals are simply absent rather than negative. The only references are NVD/CVE records and the NVIDIA product-security advisory directory (advisory 5915) - these are authoritative sourcing but are not exploit code. Net: this is a genuine high-severity memory-corruption bug worth patching on a near-term (this-week) cadence, but the local vector and mandatory user interaction materially cap real-world risk versus a network-exploitable RCE; the absence of EPSS/KEV/POC means urgency rests on the vendor-reported severity and Decision label, not on evidence of exploitation.

An attacker crafts a malicious physics asset or scene file (model, collision mesh, or serialized PhysX data) and delivers it to a victim through a game mod, downloaded content, shared project, or similar channel. When the victim's application loads the file through the vulnerable PhysX code, the out-of-bounds write corrupts memory, potentially yielding local code execution in the context of the host application or crashing it. No public exploit was identified in the provided data; the local vector (AV:L) and required user interaction (UI:R) mean the attacker depends on the victim opening the malicious content.