ClearanceKit CVE-2026-47133

Exploitation requires three concurrent conditions. First, the attacker must hold high-privilege write access (PR:H) to the macOS system path /Library/Application Support/clearancekit/store.db - standard macOS filesystem permissions and SIP restrict this to root-level or otherwise privileged actors; a standard user account cannot exploit this. Second, the attacker must have previously captured a legitimately signed policy snapshot from the store at a point in time when the desired (permissive) policy state was in effect - this is not a one-step exploit; it requires prior read access during an earlier policy state. Third, the substitution must occur during a specific window: (a) the opfilter-update period when the Endpoint Security filter is temporarily offline, (b) an offline-boot scenario before opfilter starts, or (c) a decrypted-backup restoration scenario. The attack does NOT succeed against a live, running opfilter with active file locks and enforced permissions. The combination of root-level access, a pre-captured snapshot, and a narrow timing window substantially limits opportunistic exploitation.

The CVSS 4.0 score of 6.9 accurately reflects a constrained but meaningful risk: AV:L confines the attack surface to local system access, PR:H demands write privileges to a system-protected path, and AT:P (attack requirements present) encodes the strict timing or scenario dependency. The subsequent-system integrity and confidentiality impacts (SC:H/SI:H) are the most consequential metrics - a successful replay silently nullifies the product's core protection function for all downstream processes. EPSS data is absent from available intelligence; exploitation probability must be inferred as low given the absence of KEV listing, no identified POC, the high-privilege local access prerequisite, and the narrow exploitation window. Real-world risk is further bounded by ClearanceKit's niche macOS deployment footprint - this is a single-developer security tool with a small installed base, not enterprise-ubiquitous infrastructure. The 'Information Disclosure' tag from source intelligence does not conflict with CVSS (VC:N is correct for the vulnerable system), but organizations using ClearanceKit to enforce data-access boundaries on sensitive hosts should treat this as high-priority given that the entire value proposition of the product - its policy enforcement - is what gets bypassed. For the general population, operational priority is low.

An attacker with root or equivalent privileges first reads and preserves a copy of /Library/Application Support/clearancekit/store.db and its data_signatures table at a moment when the enforced policies are known to be permissive - for example, during an initial deployment window or when a broad allow rule was temporarily active. Later, during the opfilter-update maintenance window when the Endpoint Security filter is momentarily offline, the attacker overwrites the live policy store with the captured snapshot. On the next boot, opfilter validates the ECDSA signatures - which remain cryptographically valid - and silently enforces the outdated permissive policies, allowing processes that should be blocked to access sensitive files without any alert or policy violation recorded.