Autodesk Shared Components CVE-2025-9460

Exploitation requires an attacker to deliver a maliciously crafted SLDPRT (part) file and for a victim user to open or import that file into an affected Autodesk product that invokes the vulnerable shared-component parser; the out-of-bounds read occurs during parsing of attacker-controlled file structures. This is a local, file-driven attack (AV:L) with no network reachability and no authentication bypass - the key limiting factor is mandatory user interaction (UI:R): no code runs until a user actively opens the hostile file, which demands successful social engineering or a trusted file-exchange channel. There is no indication a non-default configuration is required; default handling of SLDPRT imports appears sufficient to reach the flaw.

The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, base 7.8 HIGH) describes a client-side, file-parsing flaw: the attacker needs no prior privileges (PR:N) but DOES need the victim to open a malicious SLDPRT file (UI:R, AV:L) - this is not a remotely reachable network vulnerability despite the HIGH severity. No EPSS score was provided in the input, there is no CISA KEV listing, and no public exploit code was identified, so all three exploitation-likelihood signals are either absent or negative. The high base score is driven entirely by the triple C:H/I:H/A:H impact (potential arbitrary code execution in the process context), not by ease or probability of exploitation. Net assessment: this is a genuine-but-second-tier priority typical of CAD/engineering file-parser bugs - serious impact if triggered, but gated behind social engineering and user interaction, with no evidence of active or in-the-wild exploitation. Note a cross-source nuance: the affected-product identity is 'Autodesk shared components,' yet SLDPRT is natively a SolidWorks (Dassault) part-file extension, indicating the flaw is in Autodesk's third-party/interop import path - verify exact affected Autodesk applications against Autodesk advisory ADSK-SA-2025-0024.

An attacker crafts a malicious SLDPRT part file and delivers it via email, a shared project repository, or a supplier/contractor file exchange, then relies on an engineer opening or importing it into a vulnerable Autodesk application. Parsing the file triggers an out-of-bounds read that can crash the application, leak adjacent memory, or - in the worst case - be chained to execute arbitrary code in the context of the current user. No public proof-of-concept was identified at the time of analysis, and exploitation requires that specific user action.