EUVD-2025-210668
GHSA-f723-8mf9-84xv
Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Physical board access required (AV:P); no privileges or user interaction needed once present; impact is low confidentiality disclosure only, no integrity or availability consequence.
Primary rating from Vendor (CyberDanube).
CVSS VectorVendor: CyberDanube
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionCVE.org
TBEA TLogger V2.1.0.0B0.0.0.0 exposes a UART interface on the device's circuit board without sufficient protection. A physically proximate attacker can connect to the UART interface and observe the device boot process and runtime debug output. The disclosed information includes operating system details, software versions, network configuration, filesystem paths, and other implementation and debugging information that may assist an attacker in further compromising the device.
AnalysisAI
Physical access to the TBEA TLogger V2.1.0.0B0.0.0.0 (Communication Box 3rd Generation) PCB exposes an unprotected UART debug interface, allowing a physically proximate attacker to intercept the device boot process and runtime debug output without any authentication. Disclosed data - including OS version strings, software versions, network configuration, filesystem paths, and implementation internals - provides a reconnaissance foundation that can materially assist subsequent compromise of the device or connected infrastructure. No public exploit code and no active exploitation (CISA KEV) have been identified at time of analysis.
Technical ContextAI
The TBEA TLogger is an industrial data logger and communication box (3rd generation) used in energy monitoring or infrastructure telemetry contexts, identified under CPE cpe:2.3:a:tbea:tbea_tlogger_(tbea_communication_box_3rd_generation):*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*. The vulnerable component is the UART (Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter) serial interface, a low-level communication channel routinely exposed on embedded device PCBs during development for diagnostic and debug purposes but frequently left enabled in production firmware by oversight. CWE-497 (Exposure of Sensitive System Information to an Unauthorized Control Sphere) defines the root cause class: the device transmits sensitive system internals over a physically accessible interface with no access control - no authentication, no encryption, no physical protection such as header pin removal or enclosure controls. The disclosed information (OS details, software versions, network addresses, filesystem paths, debug messages) is consumed passively via a UART-to-USB adapter connected to exposed test points or header pins, requiring no exploitation of a software flaw - only presence at the board.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch has been identified at time of analysis; the sole reference (https://en.tbea.com/about.html) does not link to a security bulletin or fixed firmware version, and organizations should contact TBEA directly to request a security advisory and patched firmware. As the primary compensating control, deploy TLogger devices inside locked, tamper-evident enclosures that restrict physical PCB access to authorized personnel only - this directly eliminates the attack vector at negligible operational cost and is the most effective mitigation available. If the UART debug interface is not operationally required, request that TBEA provide a production firmware build with UART output disabled; however, this may require vendor cooperation and should be tested against operational requirements before deployment, as disabling debug output could impair diagnostic capability. Conduct a physical inventory of all deployed TLogger units to identify those in high-traffic, mixed-trust, or poorly controlled locations (e.g., unsecured equipment rooms, shared facilities), and prioritize enclosure upgrades for those units. Tamper-evident labels on enclosures provide detection capability if physical access occurs.
SQL injection in the web server of TBEA TLogger (TBEA Communication Box 3rd Generation), firmware V2.1.0.0B0.0.0.0, lets
Root-level device takeover in TBEA TLogger V2.1.0.0B0.0.0.0 (the TBEA Communication Box 3rd Generation) stems from a har
Authentication bypass in the web management server of TBEA TLogger (firmware V2.1.0.0B0.0.0.0), a data-logging communica
Unauthenticated remote denial-of-service and device manipulation in TBEA TLogger V2.1.0.0B0.0.0.0 (Communication Box 3rd
TBEA TLogger V2.1.0.0B0.0.0.0 (Communication Box 3rd Generation) exposes an unauthenticated HTTP PUT endpoint at /tmp/ t
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External POC / Exploit Code
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