Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
AV:N and PR:N confirmed by CWE-306 and description; S:U as impact is contained to the TLogger device itself; C:N as no data exfiltration is described.
Primary rating from Vendor (CyberDanube).
CVSS VectorVendor: CyberDanube
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
TBEA TLogger V2.1.0.0B0.0.0.0 contains multiple unauthenticated denial-of-service vulnerabilities in its web server. An unauthenticated remote attacker can invoke specific HTTP endpoints to reboot or reset the device, clear application data, or terminate the web server through a segmentation fault. In addition, multiple action endpoints process attacker-controlled parameters using unsafe string operations such as sprintf() and strcat() without adequate bounds checking, allowing crafted input to trigger buffer overflows and crash the web server. The affected endpoints include onRestart, onReset, ClearData, uploadInvFile, getIndiaRPData, YearCaparity, TotalfaultData, recordData, InvHistoryData, CollectHistoryData, InvFaultData, GetPortTableByParm, and UpdatePortConfig.
AnalysisAI
Unauthenticated remote denial-of-service and device manipulation in TBEA TLogger V2.1.0.0B0.0.0.0 (Communication Box 3rd Generation) allows any network-adjacent attacker to reboot or factory-reset the device, erase application data, or crash the web server - all without credentials. Beyond the missing authentication (CWE-306), multiple data-handling endpoints use unsafe C-style string operations (sprintf, strcat) without bounds checking, providing a second crash vector via crafted parameter input. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and the device has not been added to the CISA KEV catalog.
Technical ContextAI
TBEA TLogger is an industrial OT communication and data logging device (3rd generation communication box) used in energy infrastructure, likely solar or power generation contexts given TBEA's primary business. The affected firmware version V2.1.0.0B0.0.0.0 exposes an embedded web server with at least fourteen named HTTP action endpoints - including onRestart, onReset, ClearData, uploadInvFile, GetPortTableByParm, and UpdatePortConfig among others. CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function) identifies the root cause: administrative operations such as device restart, factory reset, and data clearing are reachable without any authentication gate. A secondary root cause present in the data-processing endpoints is classic stack or heap corruption through unbounded use of sprintf() and strcat() in C-language firmware, a pattern common in embedded IoT devices that lack modern memory-safe language protections or compiler mitigations.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch has been identified at time of analysis; the only reference provided leads to TBEA's generic corporate website rather than any security advisory or firmware download page. Operators should contact TBEA directly for firmware updates and monitor the vendor site for advisories. Until a patch is available, the most effective compensating control is network isolation: place TLogger devices behind a firewall or industrial DMZ that blocks all inbound HTTP access from untrusted networks, as all confirmed attack vectors require direct HTTP reachability. If remote management is operationally necessary, restrict access exclusively through a VPN or jump host, which eliminates the unauthenticated network exposure. Disabling the web server interface entirely (if the device supports CLI or local-only management) removes the attack surface at the cost of losing remote monitoring capability. Do not expose TLogger HTTP ports directly to the internet under any circumstances given the severity of the missing authentication.
SQL injection in the web server of TBEA TLogger (TBEA Communication Box 3rd Generation), firmware V2.1.0.0B0.0.0.0, lets
Root-level device takeover in TBEA TLogger V2.1.0.0B0.0.0.0 (the TBEA Communication Box 3rd Generation) stems from a har
Authentication bypass in the web management server of TBEA TLogger (firmware V2.1.0.0B0.0.0.0), a data-logging communica
TBEA TLogger V2.1.0.0B0.0.0.0 (Communication Box 3rd Generation) exposes an unauthenticated HTTP PUT endpoint at /tmp/ t
Physical access to the TBEA TLogger V2.1.0.0B0.0.0.0 (Communication Box 3rd Generation) PCB exposes an unprotected UART
Same technique Authentication Bypass
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2025-210671
GHSA-h63r-9fqg-pvq9