openssl_encrypt EUVD-2026-67045

The attacker must first obtain one or more wrapped pepper blobs from the target system - via data breach, exposed backup, misconfigured object storage, or another read-access vector. Once blobs are in hand, the attack is entirely offline and requires no further access to the target environment. The absence of per-user salting means no per-user precomputation is required: a single dictionary table attacks all users simultaneously. Limiting factors include the requirement to obtain the blob files (read access to storage or a prior breach is required) and the fact that users with long, high-entropy passwords may resist dictionary and rainbow-table attacks even under this weak derivation. The CVSS 4.0 vector (PR:N/AC:L) reflects the assumption that blob access is achievable without privilege, which holds in breach or misconfiguration scenarios but not in hardened deployments where storage is strictly access-controlled.

The CVSS 4.0 score of 8.7 with vector AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N is assessed as credible but conditional: the network vector and zero-privilege rating assume that wrapped pepper blobs are accessible without authentication - plausible in scenarios such as data breaches, exposed object storage, backup compromise, or insecure API endpoints, but not universally true. The high confidentiality impact (VC:H) reflects real-world password recovery across an entire user fleet from a single precomputed attack, which is a severe, cascading consequence. Integrity and availability impacts are correctly rated N. EPSS data was not included in the source intelligence; given no KEV listing and no known POC, opportunistic mass exploitation is not currently evidenced, but the offline nature of the attack means detection is essentially impossible once blobs are obtained. The primary real-world risk is a data-breach amplifier: organizations where blobs are exfiltrated face complete password compromise for all users, not just the exfiltrated subset. The absence of salting makes this categorically worse than ordinary hash-cracking - a single attack artifacts decrypts everyone.

An attacker who exfiltrates a backup archive or gains read access to the application's data store obtains a collection of wrapped pepper blobs for all users. Because the wrap key is derived from the password without a salt, the attacker precomputes a single SHA-256 or HKDF-SHA256 dictionary table covering common passwords and then tests it against every user's blob simultaneously using GPU hardware at billions of guesses per second, recovering passwords for a significant fraction of the user population in hours.