stigmem-node EUVD-2026-62405

Exploitation requires two concurrent preconditions to be satisfied: first, an operator must have set the configuration flag that disables plugin signature enforcement - this is a non-default operator action, as the advisory implies enforcement is enabled by default; second, the plugin directory must be writable by users with lower trust than the process owner. Neither condition alone is sufficient. Exploitation is strictly local (AV:L) and requires at minimum low-privilege local system access (PR:L) to write to the plugin directory. The CVSS 4.0 AT:P metric confirms that specific environmental conditions - the misconfigured flag and writable directory - must be pre-established before an attacker can act. This vulnerability is not exploitable against default, correctly configured deployments where signature enforcement remains enabled and plugin directory permissions follow the principle of least privilege.

The CVSS 4.0 score of 7.3 with AV:L, PR:L, and AT:P reflects a nuanced risk profile: while the impact is high (full VC:H/VI:H/VA:H), exploitation is gated by two operator-introduced preconditions that would not exist in a correctly configured production deployment. This is not a remotely exploitable default-configuration flaw - it is a misconfiguration-to-RCE path requiring local low-privilege access, a disabled signature enforcement flag, and a writable plugin directory. No EPSS data was provided in the input; KEV status is not confirmed; no POC code has been identified. Taken together, the real-world priority is moderate: environments that actively use stigmem-node's plugin system and that may have development configs bleeding into shared environments face genuine risk, while production instances with signature enforcement enabled and restricted plugin directory permissions are unaffected. The pre-release version numbering (0.9.0a1) also suggests the affected software is not yet in broad production deployment.

A developer sets the single disable-signature-enforcement flag during local testing and inadvertently promotes this configuration to a shared staging environment where the plugin directory is writable by other team members or service accounts. A less-trusted local user with write access to the plugin directory places an unsigned malicious plugin file in that directory; stigmem-node loads and executes it during its next plugin initialization cycle, granting the attacker arbitrary code execution under the process owner's privileges. No public proof-of-concept has been identified at time of analysis, but the attack path requires no technical sophistication once the two preconditions are met.