GoClaw EUVD-2026-43616

Exploitation requires that the attacker hold at least low-level authenticated access to the GoClaw instance, as confirmed by PR:L in the CVSS 4.0 vector. The vulnerable code path is the handleNavigate function in pkg/browser/tool.go, which must be reachable over the network (AV:N). No user interaction is required (UI:N) and no special attack complexity or prerequisites beyond authentication apply (AC:L, AT:N). Exploitation is limited by: (1) the mandatory low-privilege authentication barrier - unauthenticated remote exploitation is not supported by the available data; (2) only low confidentiality impact (VC:L) - the disclosed information is not confirmed to include high-value secrets; and (3) no integrity or availability impact, bounding the blast radius. The specific GoClaw deployment must expose the browser tool component externally for remote exploitation to be feasible.

The CVSS 4.0 base score of 5.3 (Medium) is broadly consistent with the actual risk profile. The vector AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N indicates network-accessible exploitation with low privilege required and no user interaction, but only low confidentiality impact with no integrity or availability consequence. The E:P (Proof of Concept) threat metric elevates practical concern, as a working exploit is publicly referenced and could be adapted by less sophisticated actors. The vulnerability is NOT listed in the CISA KEV catalog, meaning active exploitation in the wild has not been confirmed by authoritative sources. No EPSS score was provided in the input, so probabilistic exploitation likelihood cannot be quantified here. The primary risk-limiting factor is the PR:L requirement - exploitation is not anonymous; the attacker must hold at least some level of authenticated access to GoClaw. The low confidentiality impact (VC:L) further constrains damage potential: this does not appear to expose highly sensitive secrets, though the specific data disclosed depends on deployment context. Overall, this is a real but bounded vulnerability - priority for organizations running GoClaw in multi-tenant or externally-accessible configurations; lower urgency in tightly controlled internal deployments.

An attacker with low-level authenticated access to a GoClaw instance crafts a malicious targetUrl value and submits it to the handleNavigate function via the tool's network-accessible interface. The function processes the manipulated URL without proper validation, causing sensitive information - potentially internal path data, environment details, or application state - to be disclosed in the response or logs. A public proof-of-concept is available at https://github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/issues/1207, lowering the bar for exploitation by moderately skilled actors.