GoClaw CVE-2026-16121

Low-privilege authentication is required - the CVSS 4.0 vector specifies PR:L, meaning the attacker must hold at least a basic authenticated account on the GoClaw instance; fully unauthenticated exploitation is not supported by available data. The vulnerable code path in internal/tools/exec_approval.go must be reachable over the network (AV:N), so GoClaw must be deployed with its exec approval endpoint network-accessible. No user interaction is required (UI:N) and no special attack conditions apply (AT:N, AC:L). Exploitation is therefore limited to authenticated principals with access to the exec approval function; environments that restrict GoClaw access to a small set of trusted accounts significantly reduce the realistic attack surface. No specific non-default configuration is documented as a prerequisite beyond the tool being deployed and reachable.

The CVSS 4.0 score of 5.3 (Medium) with vector AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N reflects a remotely exploitable flaw requiring only low-privilege authentication and no special conditions or user interaction. The impact metrics (VC:L/VI:L/VA:L) indicate partial but not total system compromise in isolation. The E:P modifier confirms a publicly available proof-of-concept, elevating practical exploitability above theoretical. The vulnerability is not in CISA KEV, so active mass exploitation is not confirmed - though targeted exploitation by authenticated insiders or credential holders is plausible given the POC availability. No EPSS score was provided, limiting probabilistic exploitation forecasting. Real-world severity scales significantly with deployment context: in environments where GoClaw governs binary approvals for automated pipelines, a bypass could enable supply-chain-style injection of unauthorized code into trusted execution flows, making the effective risk higher than the medium CVSS score suggests.

An attacker holding a low-privilege account on an internet-exposed or network-accessible GoClaw instance sends a crafted exec approval request that manipulates the isSafeBin authorization check, causing it to incorrectly return an approval for a restricted binary. With a publicly available proof-of-concept referenced via GitHub issue https://github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/issues/1214, the attack requires minimal technical skill beyond possessing valid credentials. In a CI/CD or build automation context, this enables injection and execution of unauthorized binaries within a trusted pipeline, potentially undermining software supply chain integrity.