GoClaw CVE-2026-7505

No special conditions - remote unauthenticated exploitation against default GoClaw/GoClaw Lite deployments exposing WebSocket RPC endpoints. The CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N confirms network accessibility with low attack complexity, no required privileges, and no user interaction. Exploitation requires only the ability to initiate WebSocket connections to the target instance (default port 8080 or any configured gateway port). The vulnerability affects the core RPC gateway handler, not an optional feature or non-default configuration. All methods misclassified by the fail-open MethodRole() policy become accessible once the authentication fallback is triggered, including privileged operations like configuration retrieval (config.get, config.schema), agent manipulation (agents.create/update/delete/linksCreate), heartbeat control (heartbeat.set/toggle), and team/tenant management (teams.membersAdd/remove, tenants.create/update).

Real-world risk is HIGH despite moderate CVSS 7.3. Multiple risk signals align: CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N confirms trivial remote unauthenticated exploitation with no user interaction required. CVSS temporal metrics E:P (proof-of-concept exists) and RL:O (official fix available) are independently confirmed by GitHub issue #866 (public exploit scenario) and release v3.9.0 (vendor patch). The vulnerability enables Authentication Bypass (per tags), allowing complete circumvention of role-based access controls. Source code diff reveals exposed methods include config.get (credential exfiltration), heartbeat.set/toggle (service disruption), agents.create/update/delete (backdoor deployment), and teams.task.delete (data destruction). The attack is fully remote against default WebSocket endpoints with zero configuration prerequisites. Exploitability is straightforward: establish WebSocket connection with empty/invalid credentials to trigger Path 4 fallback, then invoke privileged methods that MethodRole() misclassifies as viewer-accessible. Patch availability since v3.9.0 reduces urgency for patched systems but unpatched instances face immediate credential theft and infrastructure manipulation risk. Organizations using GoClaw for agent management or team collaboration are at elevated risk of lateral movement and privilege escalation in compromised networks.

Attacker identifies a GoClaw instance via network scanning (WebSocket endpoint typically on port 8080 or 443). They establish a WebSocket connection with an empty or fabricated authentication token, triggering the vulnerable Path 4 fallback that grants authenticated viewer status. The attacker enumerates available RPC methods and invokes config.get to exfiltrate API keys and database credentials, then calls agents.create to deploy a backdoor agent with owner privileges on managed endpoints. Finally, they use heartbeat.toggle to disable monitoring on compromised agents, evading detection. Public proof-of-concept code exists (GitHub issue #866 per references), lowering the skill barrier for exploitation.