Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Physical vector required for UART access; no privileges needed for unauthenticated console; confidentiality-only impact from credential and key disclosure with no integrity or availability effect.
Primary rating from Vendor (icscert).
CVSS VectorVendor: icscert
CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionCVE.org
During WiFi association, Naxclow device firmware prints the host network’s SSID, PSK, and negotiated WPA keys in cleartext to an exposed UART console on production hardware. The UART pads are labeled, run with default serial settings, and drop to an interactive RT-Thread shell that permits arbitrary memory reads, enabling full firmware extraction. An attacker with brief physical access, common for outdoor-mounted devices, can therefore recover WiFi credentials and bootstrap firmware-side attacks.
AnalysisAI
WiFi credential exposure in Naxclow IoT device firmware (Smart Doorbell X3, X Smart Home, V720, Ix Cam) allows any attacker with brief physical access to recover host network SSID, PSK, and negotiated WPA keys printed in cleartext to a labeled, production-accessible UART debug console. The UART interface drops to an unauthenticated interactive RT-Thread shell, enabling arbitrary memory reads and full firmware extraction - escalating a credential-theft opportunity into a platform for deeper firmware-level compromise. Reported via CISA ICS-CERT advisory ICSA-26-162-02; no public exploit code identified, though the attack requires only commodity serial hardware and minimal technical knowledge.
Technical ContextAI
The affected devices run RT-Thread, a real-time operating system widely used in embedded and IoT products, and expose a hardware UART debug interface that was not disabled or sanitized for production builds. CWE-538 (Insertion of Sensitive Information into Externally-Accessible File or Directory) describes the root cause: during the WPA/WPA2 WiFi association handshake, the firmware logs sensitive cryptographic material - SSID, pre-shared key (PSK), and negotiated session keys - directly to the serial console without redaction. The UART pads are labeled on the PCB, operate at default serial settings (typically 115200/8N1), and expose an unauthenticated interactive shell with memory-read primitives. Four product lines are confirmed affected per CPE data: cpe:2.3:a:naxclow:smart_doorbell_x3, cpe:2.3:a:naxclow:x_smart_home, cpe:2.3:a:naxclow:v720, and cpe:2.3:a:naxclow:ix_cam. The combination of labeled pads, default baud settings, and an interactive shell indicates this is an unremediated development/debug artifact shipped in production firmware.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch version has been identified from the available data; the CPE wildcard entries suggest no patched firmware release has been scoped at time of analysis. Consult the CISA ICS-CERT advisory ICSA-26-162-02 at https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-162-02 and the corresponding CSAF file at https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-162-02.json for updated remediation guidance from the vendor. Until a firmware patch is available, the following specific compensating controls apply: physically restrict access to deployed devices using tamper-evident enclosures or security screws that require tools to open (this raises the attacker's time-on-target and detection risk, though it does not eliminate the vulnerability); deploy devices only in locations with physical security controls such as CCTV coverage or restricted access zones; consider network segmentation of the WiFi network used by these devices so that PSK compromise limits lateral movement; and monitor for unauthorized WiFi client connections using the host access point's client association logs. Disabling the UART at the hardware level (e.g., depopulating pads) is the most effective compensating control but requires vendor or integrator intervention and voids typical support agreements.
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Same technique Information Disclosure
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-36538
GHSA-ccf8-539p-4gc2