What is the CVSS score of EUVD-2026-35889?

EUVD-2026-35889 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 5.3 (Medium). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.0%.

Is there a patch available for EUVD-2026-35889?

Yes, a patch is available for EUVD-2026-35889. Update the affected software to the latest version immediately.

Spring Security EUVD-2026-35889

| CVE-2026-41694 MEDIUM

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature (CWE-347)

2026-06-10 security@vmware.com

GHSA-ww38-37g9-m3q3

Java Information Disclosure Oracle VMware Jwt Attack Spring Security

5.3

CVSS 3.1 · NVD

Severity by source

Vendor (vmware) PRIMARY

LOW

qualitative

NVD

5.3 MEDIUM

AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Primary rating from Vendor (vmware).

CVSS VectorNVD

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

Low

Integrity

None

Availability

None

Lifecycle Timeline

Severity Changed

Jun 12, 2026 - 20:37 NVD

LOW MEDIUM

CVSS changed

Jun 12, 2026 - 20:37 NVD

3.7 (LOW) 5.3 (MEDIUM)

Patch available

Jun 10, 2026 - 02:01 EUVD

Analysis Generated

Jun 10, 2026 - 00:39 vuln.today

Blast Radius

ecosystem impact

† from your stack dependencies † transitive graph · vuln.today resolves 4-path depth

3 maven packages depend on org.springframework.security:spring-security-saml2-service-provider (1 direct, 2 indirect)

Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 7.0.0.

DescriptionNVD

Since Spring Security SAML decrypts SAML Responses as well as elements of SAML LogoutRequests and LogoutResponses without requiring a valid signature, attackers may be able to craft these SAML payloads and use the Service Provider as a decryption oracle.

Affected versions: Spring Security 5.7.0 through 5.7.23; 5.8.0 through 5.8.25; 6.3.0 through 6.3.16; 6.4.0 through 6.4.16; 6.5.0 through 6.5.10; 7.0.0 through 7.0.5.

AnalysisAI

Decryption oracle exposure in Spring Security's SAML module allows unauthenticated remote attackers (PR:N, AV:N per CVSS) to submit crafted SAML Responses, LogoutRequests, and LogoutResponses to a Service Provider endpoint and leverage the SP's private key for decryption without presenting a valid XML signature. Affected deployments span Spring Security 5.7.x through 7.0.x that use SAML-based SSO or Single Logout. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis and EPSS data was not provided, but the attack class (XML encryption oracle) is well-documented in SAML security research and carries meaningful risk in identity-sensitive environments.

Technical ContextAI

Spring Security's SAML 2.0 support implements SSO and Single Logout (SLO) by processing XML-encrypted assertions and message elements. The root cause is CWE-347 (Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature): the implementation follows a 'decrypt-then-verify' ordering rather than the secure 'verify-then-decrypt' pattern. Because signature validation is not enforced prior to decryption of SAML Responses and logout message elements, the Service Provider's private key is exercised on attacker-supplied ciphertext. This is a classic XML Encryption Attack / SAML decryption oracle pattern - by submitting iteratively modified ciphertext blobs and observing error-based or timing-based response differences, an attacker can recover plaintext. The affected Java library spans Spring Security 5.7.0 through 7.0.5. The 'Jwt Attack' tag in the source metadata appears inconsistent with the XML-based SAML mechanism described and is likely a metadata artifact; the vulnerability is not JWT-related. No CPE strings were supplied in the input data.

RemediationAI

Consult the vendor advisory at https://spring.io/security/cve-2026-41694 for the definitive patched release versions - exact fix version numbers were not included in the input data and could not be independently confirmed (patch available per vendor advisory). As a compensating control, restrict access to the SAML Assertion Consumer Service (ACS) and Single Logout (SLO) endpoints at the network perimeter or WAF layer to known Identity Provider source IP ranges, which removes the ability for arbitrary actors to submit crafted payloads; note this requires accurate and maintained IdP IP allowlisting and may break federated scenarios with dynamic or multi-tenant IdP infrastructure. Additionally, enforcing that the application requires valid IdP signatures on all inbound SAML messages before any processing (if configurable outside the library) provides defense in depth. If SLO is not a required feature, disabling it entirely eliminates the LogoutRequest and LogoutResponse attack surface with no SSO impact. Organizations should prioritize patching environments where SAML assertions carry high-value identity claims.