Skip to main content

CloudPirates Helm Charts EUVDEUVD-2026-33665

| CVE-2026-45132 CRITICAL
Code Injection (CWE-94)
2026-06-01 GitHub_M
10.0
CVSS 3.1 · GitHub Advisory
Share

Severity by source

GitHub Advisory PRIMARY
10.0 CRITICAL
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Primary rating from GitHub Advisory · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Source Code Evidence Fetched
Jun 01, 2026 - 17:15 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
Jun 01, 2026 - 17:15 vuln.today
CVE Published
Jun 01, 2026 - 16:13 nvd
CRITICAL 10.0

DescriptionGitHub Advisory

CloudPirates Open Source Helm Charts is a collection of Helm charts. Prior to commit fcf9302, a GitHub Actions workflow (generate-schema.yaml) exposes sensitive credentials (Personal Access Token and SSH signing key) to fork-controlled code due to unsafe checkout and credential handling practices. This issue has been patched via commit fcf9302.

AnalysisAI

Credential exposure in CloudPirates Open Source Helm Charts (prior to commit fcf9302) allows attackers to steal a Personal Access Token and SSH signing key by submitting a malicious pull request that the vulnerable GitHub Actions workflow checks out and executes with privileged secrets. The repository's generate-schema.yaml workflow used unsafe pull_request_target patterns combined with checkout of fork-controlled code, enabling code injection into a privileged CI context. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the attack pattern is well-documented for this class of GitHub Actions misconfiguration.

Technical ContextAI

The vulnerability resides in GitHub Actions workflow files (generate-schema.yaml and pull-request.yaml) within the CloudPirates Helm Charts repository, identified by CPE cpe:2.3:a:cloudpirates-io:helm-charts. The root cause is CWE-94 (Improper Control of Generation of Code / Code Injection) manifesting as a 'pwn request' style flaw: workflows triggered by pull_request_target run with the base repository's secrets and write token, yet the workflow checked out and executed code from the untrusted fork PR head. The patch (commit fcf930211604652aec15085895b6457bc8b73b54) introduces an 'authorize' gate job tied to a protected GitHub environment named 'external' which requires manual approval for forks, and removes the 'synchronize' trigger to prevent automated re-execution on PR updates.

RemediationAI

Upstream fix available via commit fcf930211604652aec15085895b6457bc8b73b54; maintainers and forks of this repository should pull or rebase onto that commit or later, which adds a manual-approval authorize gate via the 'external' GitHub environment and removes the synchronize trigger. Organizations maintaining similar workflows should audit any pull_request_target usage to ensure they never checkout untrusted PR head refs while privileged secrets are accessible, restrict GITHUB_TOKEN permissions to read-only where possible, store sensitive PATs and signing keys in environment-scoped secrets guarded by required reviewers, and consider rotating the previously exposed Personal Access Token and SSH signing key on the assumption they may have been harvested before the patch. Full advisory: https://github.com/CloudPirates-io/helm-charts/security/advisories/GHSA-r874-j8fr-x2pj.

Share

EUVD-2026-33665 vulnerability details – vuln.today

This site uses cookies essential for authentication and security. No tracking or analytics cookies are used. Privacy Policy