OpenClaw EUVD-2026-26111

Exploitation requires OpenClaw deployment with trusted-proxy authentication mode specifically enabled - this is a non-default configuration chosen when integrating with reverse proxies for SSO or centralized authentication. Attacker must possess existing low-privilege authenticated credentials (PR:L) to the OpenClaw instance. Attack succeeds when requests are submitted from non-Control-UI clients (any client interface outside the designated Control-UI path) that can declare operator scopes in authentication context. Default OpenClaw installations using native authentication are not vulnerable. The AT:P (Attack Technique Present) indicator suggests exploitation requires specific knowledge of the trusted-proxy authentication flow and scope declaration mechanisms, limiting casual exploitation but not preventing determined attackers with system familiarity.

CVSS 7.7 (High) reflects network-accessible attack with low complexity requiring only low privileges (PR:L) and no user interaction. The CVSS vector shows high impact to confidentiality, integrity, and availability (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H) with no scope change (SC:N), indicating complete compromise of the vulnerable component. Attack Technique Present (AT:P) suggests specific conditions must exist. No EPSS score provided, but the combination of publicly available patch commit (GitHub 8b88b927), detailed vendor security advisory (GHSA-g374-mggx-p6xc), and VulnCheck coverage indicates high attacker awareness. Not present in CISA KEV, suggesting targeted rather than widespread exploitation. Real-world risk is MODERATE-TO-HIGH for organizations using OpenClaw's trusted-proxy authentication mode - the attack requires authenticated access (PR:L) but delivers full admin privileges, making this a high-value target for insider threats or compromised low-privilege accounts. Organizations NOT using trusted-proxy mode are unaffected. Priority should be HIGH for environments with this specific configuration, MEDIUM otherwise. The public patch commit provides attackers a precise exploitation roadmap, increasing urgency despite no confirmed in-the-wild activity.

An attacker with low-privileged authenticated access to an OpenClaw instance configured with trusted-proxy authentication creates a non-Control-UI client and embeds operator.admin scope declarations in authentication requests. When OpenClaw processes these requests through identity-bearing authentication paths, the incomplete scope-clearing logic fails to sanitize the self-declared scopes, allowing them to persist and grant full administrative privileges. The attacker can then access admin-only functions, modify system configurations, or access sensitive data across the entire OpenClaw deployment.