Trigger.dev EUVD-2026-107023

Exploitation requires that (1) the attacker knows the target organization's ID, (2) the victim is an already-authenticated member of that organization, and (3) the victim is socially engineered into opening the attacker-crafted, unredeemed /integrations/slack/callback URL while logged in. The root cause is that the organization-level Slack OAuth flow uses the organization ID as the OAuth state without binding it to the initiating session (CWE-352). Limiting factors: it only affects Trigger.dev webapp instances before 4.5.12 that use the organization-level Slack OAuth integration; it needs an authenticated member (PR:L) plus user interaction (the member must click the link); and impact is limited to hijacking the Slack alert integration rather than full account or data compromise.

This is a medium-severity CSRF (CWE-352) with modest real-world risk. The vendor-supplied CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N, VI:L/VC:N) scores 5.3, reflecting an integrity-oriented impact rather than code execution or data breach. Exploitation status is 'no public exploit identified at time of analysis' - there is no CISA KEV listing and no POC referenced in the provided intelligence, so this is not confirmed to be actively exploited. No EPSS score was provided, so exploitation probability cannot be quantified. One notable conflict: the vendor CVSS 4.0 vector states UI:N, yet the description explicitly requires tricking an authenticated member into opening a crafted callback URL - that IS user interaction, so UI:N appears understated; verify with vendor. Additionally, CVSS encodes PR:L (the victim must be an authenticated org member), but in classic CSRF scoring the privilege belongs to the victim's session, not the attacker, who needs no credentials and only knowledge of the target organization ID. Net assessment: a credible but low-to-moderate priority issue - it requires social engineering, yields integration hijacking rather than direct compromise, and affects a developer-focused product with limited deployment footprint. Patch promptly but it is not an emergency.

An attacker who has discovered a target organization's ID crafts an unredeemed /integrations/slack/callback link tied to an attacker-controlled Slack workspace and sends it (e.g., via phishing) to an authenticated member of that organization. When the member opens the link while logged in, the OAuth state - which is just the organization ID and is not bound to the initiating session - is accepted, silently connecting the attacker's Slack workspace so that the organization's operational alerts may be delivered to the attacker. No public exploit code is identified at time of analysis.