Dokku CVE-2026-86002

Three concrete prerequisites must all hold: (1) the attacker possesses app-level Dokku access and remote SSH access permitting execution of docker-options commands against a target app running Dokku before 0.38.25; (2) the payload is stored via the docker-options plugin (also reachable through dokku run's -e/--env flag and --ttl-seconds), requiring no special non-default configuration - any app accepting docker options is affected; and (3) a subsequent build, deploy, or run operation must execute to assemble DOCKER_ARGS and pass the value through Bash eval, detonating the $(...)/backtick substitution. Limiting factors: exploitation is NOT remote-unauthenticated - it demands valid authenticated app-level credentials and SSH access, and it depends on a build/deploy/run being triggered (which the privileged user can usually initiate themselves). The risk is most acute in multi-tenant Dokku deployments where app-level access is granted to otherwise-untrusted users.

This is a genuine high-impact vulnerability (CVSS 9.0) that is nonetheless privilege-gated rather than mass-exploitable. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) shows network reachability and low complexity but requires attacker-held privileges: PR:L means the attacker must already have authenticated app-level Dokku access plus SSH rights to run docker-options commands. The scope change (S:C) and C:H/I:H/A:H reflect the true danger - the stored payload is evaluated by Bash on the host as the dokku OS user, yielding full host command execution that breaks out of any single app's boundary. Mapped to an SSVC-style framing: exploitation = none observed (no CISA KEV entry and no public exploit identified in the provided data), automatable = no (requires valid app-level credentials and a triggering build/deploy/run operation), technical impact = total. No EPSS probability was supplied, so widespread-exploitation likelihood cannot be quantified from this data; the absence of KEV/POC signals combined with the authentication requirement suggests this is an insider or compromised-credential / multi-tenant abuse risk rather than an opportunistic internet-wide threat. Note that UI:R is debatable: a user with app-level access can often trigger their own deploy, which would remove the user-interaction barrier and raise effective severity. Priority is high for multi-tenant Dokku hosts where untrusted parties hold app-level access, and lower for single-operator installs.

An attacker who already holds app-level Dokku access and SSH rights runs dokku docker-options:add to store a value containing a shell command substitution such as $(...) or backticks. When a build, deploy, or run operation subsequently assembles DOCKER_ARGS, the stored string is processed by Bash eval and the substitution executes on the host as the dokku operating-system user, giving arbitrary command execution and effective control of the entire Dokku host. No public exploit was identified at time of analysis, though the fixing commit diff publicly reveals the vulnerable eval set -- "$DOCKER_ARGS" pattern.