Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L
AC:H reflects the mandatory prerequisite of prior hub compromise to obtain credentials; remaining metrics align with vendor vector.
Primary rating from Vendor (redhat).
CVSS VectorVendor: redhat
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
A flaw was found in multicluster-global-hub. The manager component improperly validates the source identity of incoming CloudEvents on Kafka status topics. A remote attacker, after compromising a managed hub and obtaining its Kafka client certificate, can manipulate the self-asserted source identity. This allows the attacker to falsify or delete critical data, such as compliance, inventory, and cluster health information, belonging to other hubs in the database.
AnalysisAI
Insufficient source identity validation in Red Hat Multicluster Global Hub's manager component allows a network-adjacent attacker who has compromised a managed hub to impersonate any other hub on the shared Kafka status bus. By presenting a legitimately obtained Kafka client certificate from the compromised hub while falsifying the CloudEvent source field, the attacker can overwrite or delete compliance records, inventory data, and cluster health telemetry belonging to sibling hubs in the shared database. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but the scope-changed CVSS vector (S:C) reflects that the integrity impact extends beyond the initially compromised hub to the entire multi-hub management plane.
Technical ContextAI
The affected component is the manager in Red Hat Multicluster Global Hub (CPE: cpe:2.3:a:red_hat:multicluster_global_hub:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*), a Kubernetes-native solution for managing fleets of OpenShift/ACM hub clusters. Hubs communicate status via CloudEvents transported over Apache Kafka, using mTLS client certificates for transport-layer authentication. The root cause is CWE-345 (Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity): the manager trusts the self-asserted 'source' field in incoming CloudEvent payloads rather than cryptographically binding the event's source identity to the presenting Kafka client certificate. Because certificate ownership and CloudEvent source claims are validated independently, a certificate from hub-A can be used to publish events asserting they originate from hub-B.
RemediationAI
Patch available per vendor advisory - consult https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-71576 for the specific patched release, as an exact fix version was not included in the available data at time of analysis. As a compensating control prior to patching, restrict Kafka topic write permissions so that each managed hub's client certificate is authorized only to produce on its own designated status topic, preventing cross-hub topic writes at the broker ACL layer; this adds broker-side enforcement that does not rely on application-layer source validation. Additionally, audit the manager's CloudEvent ingestion pipeline to verify that the source field is validated against the presenting client certificate's Subject or SAN, and consider deploying Kafka audit logging to detect anomalous cross-hub source claims. These controls reduce risk but do not eliminate the root CWE-345 flaw, which requires a code-level fix from Red Hat.
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-55674
GHSA-q5c4-r3vh-f379