EUVD-2026-39489
GHSA-54hh-g5mx-jqcp
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
AC:H because the attacker must first control registry content for an already-pinned version; UI:R as a victim must run a non-frozen install; C:H/I:H from installing attacker-chosen code, A:N as availability is not the impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M).
CVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Lifecycle Timeline
8DescriptionNVD
pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.0 and 11.4.0, pnpm install in non-frozen mode can accept new remote package content after detecting that the downloaded tarball does not match the integrity recorded in pnpm-lock.yaml. When a package is already locked with an integrity value, and the registry later serves different metadata and tarball content for the same package name and version, pnpm initially reports an integrity mismatch. However, plain pnpm install then performs a resolution repair, accepts the registry's new integrity, updates the lockfile, installs the new content, and exits successfully. This means the lockfile integrity check does not act as a hard stop by default. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.34.0 and 11.4.0.
AnalysisAI
Lockfile integrity bypass in the pnpm package manager (versions below 10.34.0, and 11.0.0 through 11.4.0) lets a malicious or compromised registry override a package version's previously recorded hash. On a plain pnpm install in non-frozen mode, pnpm detects the tarball-vs-lockfile integrity mismatch, warns, then silently performs a 'resolution repair' that accepts the registry's new integrity, rewrites pnpm-lock.yaml, and installs the substituted content while exiting 0. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Requires three concrete conditions: (1) the install is run in NON-FROZEN mode - i.e., plain `pnpm install` WITHOUT --frozen-lockfile, so pnpm's resolution-repair path is allowed to run; (2) the attacker controls the content the registry returns for an already-locked (package name + version) pair - a compromised/hijacked registry, a malicious mirror, or MITM of a non-HTTPS registry - serving a tarball whose hash differs from the one in pnpm-lock.yaml; (3) the victim runs the install on a clean store/cache so the altered tarball is actually fetched. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | Signals are mixed and should be read together rather than off the headline CVSS 8.1. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker who has compromised an internal mirror, a self-hosted registry, or an HTTP registry path replaces the tarball and metadata for an already-pinned dependency (e.g., example-package@1.0.0) with malicious content carrying a new hash. A developer or CI job runs a normal `pnpm install` (non-frozen) on a clean store; pnpm flags the integrity mismatch but then 'repairs' the lockfile, installs the malicious v2 content, rewrites pnpm-lock.yaml to trust it, and exits 0. … |
| Remediation | Vendor-released patch: upgrade to pnpm 10.34.0 (for the 10.x/older line) or pnpm 11.4.0 (for the 11.x line), per advisory GHSA-54hh-g5mx-jqcp (https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-54hh-g5mx-jqcp). … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours: Audit all development and CI/CD environments to identify deployed pnpm versions (< 10.34.0 or 11.0.0-11.4.0). …
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External POC / Exploit Code
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