What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-50015?

CVE-2026-50015 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.3 (High). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.2%.

Which versions of pnpm are affected by CVE-2026-50015?

pnpm package manager prior to versions 10.34.0 and 11.4.0 is vulnerable to arbitrary file write and deletion through malicious patch files in pull requests.. A patch is available.

Is there a public PoC exploit available for CVE-2026-50015?

Yes, a public proof-of-concept exploit is available for CVE-2026-50015. Prioritise patching immediately. EPSS: 0.2%.

How to fix or mitigate CVE-2026-50015?

Within 24 hours: Inventory all internal projects and CI/CD pipelines using pnpm; document current versions for each. Within 7 days: Enforce two-reviewer approval for all `.patch` file changes with explicit path validation; restrict pnpm install to isolated, ephemeral container environments in CI/CD; disable @pnpm/patch-package if the organization does not actively use patch files. Within 30 days: Monitor for release of pnpm 10.34.0 and 11.4.0; prepare and test upgrade path; schedule staged rollout beginning with non-critical projects.

pnpm CVE-2026-50015

EUVD-2026-39492 HIGH

Path Traversal (CWE-22)

2026-06-25 GitHub_M

GHSA-rxhj-4m44-96r4

Path Traversal Pnpm Red Hat

7.3

CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: GitHub_M

Severity by source

Vendor (GitHub_M) PRIMARY

7.3 HIGH

AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

vuln.today AI

8.1 HIGH

Submitting a public PR needs no privileges on the victim (PR:N), but a maintainer must run install (UI:R); reliable traversal (AC:L) yields high integrity/availability impact and no confidentiality loss.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Red Hat

7.3 HIGH

qualitative

Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M).

CVSS VectorVendor: GitHub_M

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

Low

User Interaction

Required

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

None

Integrity

High

Availability

High

Lifecycle Timeline

Patch available

Jun 25, 2026 - 19:17 EUVD

Analysis Generated

Jun 25, 2026 - 18:18 vuln.today

DescriptionCVE.org

pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.0 and 11.4.0, pnpm's patch application pipeline (@pnpm/patch-package) performs no path validation on file paths extracted from .patch files. An attacker who contributes a malicious patch file via a pull request can write attacker-controlled content to or delete arbitrary files on the filesystem during pnpm install, as the user running the install. The diff --git header paths containing ../../ sequences traverse out of the package directory, and the traversal is difficult to catch in code review because patch file diff headers are opaque to most reviewers. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.34.0 and 11.4.0.

AnalysisAI

Arbitrary file write and deletion in pnpm package manager (versions prior to 10.34.0 and 11.4.0) lets a malicious contributor abuse the @pnpm/patch-package pipeline, which applies .patch files without validating the file paths in their diff --git headers. Because patch diff headers are opaque to most code reviewers, an attacker can slip ../../ traversal sequences into a pull request and, when a maintainer runs pnpm install, write attacker-controlled content to or delete arbitrary files with the privileges of the installing user. There is no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and the issue is not listed in CISA KEV; the moderate-to-high CVSS of 7.3 reflects high integrity and availability impact gated by required user interaction.

Technical ContextAI

The flaw lives in pnpm's patch application feature (@pnpm/patch-package), which lets projects ship .patch files in the patchedDependencies field of package.json to modify installed dependency source at install time. Patches are unified diffs whose diff --git a/... b/... and +++/--- headers declare which files to modify; pnpm parses these headers and writes the resulting files relative to the target package directory. The root cause is CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory / Path Traversal): pnpm canonicalizes and trusts the header-supplied path without confining it to the package root, so ../../ segments escape the intended directory and resolve anywhere on the filesystem the install user can reach. The affected component is identified by the CPE cpe:2.3:a:pnpm:pnpm:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*, i.e. the pnpm CLI/package itself across all versions below the fixed releases.

RemediationAI

Upgrade pnpm to a fixed release - Vendor-released patch: 10.34.0 (10.x line) or 11.4.0 (11.x line) - as documented in advisory GHSA-rxhj-4m44-96r4 (https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-rxhj-4m44-96r4); pin the upgraded version in CI runners and developer environments since the trigger is pnpm install. Until you can upgrade, treat .patch files in patchedDependencies as executable code in code review and require manual inspection of every diff --git/+++/--- header for ../ traversal sequences before merging external pull requests, accepting that this is error-prone because diff headers are opaque to reviewers. Stronger compensating controls: run installs for untrusted branches inside a sandbox or ephemeral container with no write access outside the workspace, disable or remove patchedDependencies usage where the patch feature is not needed, and forbid auto-running pnpm install in CI on unmerged fork PRs (or run such jobs with a low-privilege, isolated filesystem) - the trade-off is added CI friction and loss of the convenience of patch-based dependency fixes.