Which versions of OpenAM are affected by CVE-2026-45794?

OpenAM Community Edition versions through 16.0.6 contain unsafe Java deserialization vulnerabilities in Push Notification callbacks that allow low-privileged users to corrupt authentication tokens,…. A patch is available.

How to fix or mitigate CVE-2026-45794?

Within 24 hours: Inventory all OpenAM Community Edition instances and document their versions. Within 7 days: Patch all affected instances to OpenAM Community Edition 16.1.1; if patching cannot be completed within this window, disable the Push Notification feature or restrict network access to Push Notification endpoints to trusted networks only. Within 30 days: Validate patch deployment across all systems and confirm Push Notification functionality.

OpenAM CVE-2026-45794

HIGH

Deserialization of Untrusted Data (CWE-502)

2026-06-25 https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenAM

GHSA-pp89-732f-3g8q

Deserialization Java RCE

Severity by source

vuln.today AI

7.1 HIGH

Network-reachable but requires a low-privileged registration user (PR:L) and a dispatcher-expiry timing window (AC:H); strong integrity/availability impact via blob overwrite and DoS, limited confidentiality, RCE unconfirmed.

3.1 AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H

4.0 AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Estimated by vuln.today — no official severity rating has been published for this CVE yet.

Lifecycle Timeline

Source Code Evidence Fetched

Jun 25, 2026 - 16:50 vuln.today

Analysis Generated

Jun 25, 2026 - 16:50 vuln.today

Blast Radius

ecosystem impact

† from your stack dependencies † transitive graph · vuln.today resolves 4-path depth

1 maven packages depend on org.openidentityplatform.openam:openam-push-notification (1 direct, 0 indirect)

Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 16.1.1.

DescriptionCVE.org

Summary

Description

A Deserialization of Untrusted Data (CWE-502) issue exists in OpenAM's Push Notification SNS callback resource. The REST route that handles SNS push messages is mounted with anonymous access and, when a supplied message identifier has expired from the in-memory dispatcher, falls back to a CTS-stored predicate blob whose top-level keys are treated as Java class names and passed to Class.forName(...) before attacker-controlled JSON is deserialized via Jackson. This impacts OpenAM Community Edition through version 16.0.6. This issue was patched in version 16.1.1.

Arbitrary attacker-controlled code execution was not confirmed on tested stock classpaths for the latest release, but the flaw yields a reliable class-loading and Jackson-construction primitive whose impacts include remotely triggerable process execution, file writes, and DoS, depending on the deployment's classpath and environment.

Impact

OpenAM Community Edition deployments through version 16.0.6 that enable the Push Notification Service with SNS callbacks are potentially affected. While the callback route itself is anonymous, the planting step requires a low-privileged user who can start Push Registration and read their own QR-code payload. After that user obtains the server-issued messageId, shared secret, and challenge, they can wait for the in-memory dispatcher entry to expire and then send anonymous SNS callbacks that overwrite the persistent CTS blob with attacker-controlled JSON. A later anonymous callback for the same messageId causes OpenAM to load an attacker-named class and construct it with attacker-controlled values.

The planted blob is processed server-side with internal CTS privileges, giving a reliable class-loading and Jackson-construction primitive that can corrupt the push-token record and trigger classpath-dependent side effects in the OpenAM JVM. Arbitrary attacker-controlled command execution was not confirmed on the tested stock classpaths; practical severity depends on enabled Push Registration flows, JDK version, bundled or co-deployed classes, and whether any reachable class-loading or construction side effects are security-relevant in the deployment.

Patch

This has been patched in OpenAM Community Edition version 16.1.1. Users are encouraged to update to the latest release.

AnalysisAI

Unsafe Java deserialization (CWE-502) in OpenAM Community Edition through 16.0.6 lets attackers abuse the anonymous Push Notification SNS callback REST route to force the server to load an attacker-named class and construct it from attacker-controlled JSON via Jackson. A low-privileged user who starts Push Registration can plant a malicious CTS predicate blob, then drive anonymous callbacks that yield a reliable class-loading and Jackson-construction primitive with classpath-dependent impacts ranging from token-record corruption and DoS to potential process execution and file writes. …

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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata

Access

Authenticate as low-privileged user

Delivery

Start Push Registration, capture messageId/secret/challenge

Exploit

Wait for in-memory dispatcher entry to expire

Execution

Send anonymous SNS callback overwriting CTS blob

Persist

Trigger callback loading attacker-named class via Jackson

Impact

Corrupt push record / classpath-dependent code execution or DoS

Access

Authenticate as low-privileged user

Delivery

Start Push Registration, capture messageId/secret/challenge

Exploit

Wait for in-memory dispatcher entry to expire

Execution

Send anonymous SNS callback overwriting CTS blob

Persist

Trigger callback loading attacker-named class via Jackson

Impact

Corrupt push record / classpath-dependent code execution or DoS

Vulnerability AssessmentAI

Exploitation	Exploitation requires the OpenAM Push Notification Service to be enabled with SNS callbacks configured (the vulnerable REST route only exists in that mode). … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment.
Risk Assessment	No CVSS, EPSS, or KEV data was supplied, so quantitative signals are absent and exploitation status is 'no public exploit identified at time of analysis.' Tags (RCE, Java, Deserialization) and the advisory frame this as a deserialization-to-code-execution class issue, but the vendor explicitly states arbitrary command execution was NOT confirmed on tested stock classpaths - meaning the worst-case RCE outcome is conditional on co-deployed/bundled gadget classes, JDK version, and enabled Push flows rather than guaranteed. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in.
Exploit Scenario	A low-privileged OpenAM user starts Push Registration, captures the server-issued messageId, shared secret, and challenge from their own QR payload, and waits for the in-memory dispatcher entry to expire. They then send anonymous SNS callbacks that overwrite the persistent CTS predicate blob with crafted JSON keyed by a chosen Java class name; a subsequent anonymous callback for that messageId makes OpenAM call Class.forName on the attacker's class and construct it via Jackson with attacker-controlled values. …
Remediation	Upgrade to OpenAM Community Edition 16.1.1 or later (Vendor-released patch: 16.1.1), per advisory GHSA-pp89-732f-3g8q (https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenAM/security/advisories/GHSA-pp89-732f-3g8q). … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report.