Adobe ColdFusion CVE-2017-3066

No special conditions required for exploitation - remote unauthenticated attackers can exploit default configurations of Adobe ColdFusion 10/11/2016. The BlazeDS AMF remoting endpoints are enabled by default in ColdFusion installations and typically exposed at standard paths (/flex2gateway/, /messagebroker/). The CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N confirms network accessibility with low attack complexity, no required privileges, and no user interaction. The only prerequisite is network reachability to the ColdFusion server's BlazeDS endpoints, which are commonly internet-facing in production deployments supporting Flash/Flex applications. Organizations that have disabled BlazeDS entirely or removed the servlet mappings are not vulnerable, but this is not a default configuration. The vulnerability affects all platforms (Windows, Linux, macOS) where ColdFusion is deployed, as it is a Java-level deserialization flaw independent of the underlying operating system.

This represents an extreme real-world risk with convergence across all threat intelligence signals. The CVSS 9.8 score reflects the worst-case scenario: network-accessible (AV:N), low complexity (AC:L), no privileges required (PR:N), no user interaction (UI:N), with complete impact to confidentiality, integrity, and availability. CISA KEV listing confirms this is not theoretical - active exploitation has been observed in real-world attacks. The EPSS score of 93.36% at the 100th percentile indicates this vulnerability is exploited more frequently than nearly any other CVE, likely due to the combination of internet-exposed ColdFusion servers and readily available exploit code (Exploit-DB 43993). Unlike many high-CVSS vulnerabilities that require specific configurations, the PR:N/UI:N vector indicates this works against default ColdFusion installations. The seven-year age of this CVE combined with continued KEV status suggests adversaries maintain this in their active playbooks, and unpatched ColdFusion servers remain attractive targets. Organizations running ColdFusion must treat this as a critical emergency requiring immediate action regardless of other risk factors.

An external attacker scans the internet for exposed ColdFusion servers and identifies the BlazeDS endpoint at /flex2gateway/. Using publicly available exploit code from Exploit-DB 43993 or similar tools, the attacker crafts a malicious serialized Java object containing a payload such as a ysoserial gadget chain targeting Apache Commons Collections or other vulnerable libraries in ColdFusion's classpath. The attacker sends this crafted AMF request to the BlazeDS endpoint, which deserializes the object without validation, triggering arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the ColdFusion application server process (typically SYSTEM on Windows or the ColdFusion service account on Linux). The attacker can then install web shells, exfiltrate sensitive data from applications and databases, pivot to internal network resources, or deploy ransomware, all without requiring any credentials or user interaction.