DIRAC CVE-2026-45579
CRITICAL
GHSA-9jpv-c7p4-997x
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Network-reachable service callable by any authenticated user (PR:L) with a trivial eval payload (AC:L); scope changes (S:C) as service-account RCE exposes other users' proxies/tokens, yielding full C/I/A impact.
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionGitHub Advisory
Summary
An remote code execution vulnerability exists in RequestManager due to the use of eval on untrusted input that allows any authenticated user to run code/commands on the DIRAC server as the system user running the DIRAC services.
Details
The export_getRequestCountersWeb function is callable by any authenticated user and just passes its parameters directly to the database instance: https://github.com/DIRACGrid/DIRAC/blob/f7e0a3ac153315030fb3520e8ca747f013758967/src/DIRAC/RequestManagementSystem/Service/ReqManagerHandler.py#L270
If the groupingAttribute string is unrecognised, Request. is prepended to it and the result is passed into an eval() call: https://github.com/DIRACGrid/DIRAC/blob/f7e0a3ac153315030fb3520e8ca747f013758967/src/DIRAC/RequestManagementSystem/DB/RequestDB.py#L766-L776
By passing in a dunder string that is applicable to the Request object, it's possible to work back up to functions in the os module and trigger them to be called in the server context.
There are other uses of eval in ReqManager/RequestDB which may be equally accessible.
Impact
This allows any authenticated user to run commands on the server, which allows a full compromise of the DIRAC system (they can read the local dirac.cfg, get database passwords and export all stored proxies and tokens). If local logging is used, they can also remove evidence of the exploit from the log (it leaves an exception printout in the RequestManager log when used).
Patched versions:
https://pypi.org/project/DIRAC/8.0.79/ https://pypi.org/project/DIRAC/9.0.22/ https://pypi.org/project/DIRAC/9.1.10/
AnalysisAI
Authenticated remote code execution in DIRAC's RequestManagementSystem lets any logged-in grid user run arbitrary commands as the DIRAC service account, enabling full compromise of the DIRAC installation. The flaw stems from an eval() call reachable through the export_getRequestCountersWeb service method, and successful exploitation exposes dirac.cfg secrets, database credentials, and all stored user proxies and tokens. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Requires a valid authenticated DIRAC account (PR:L) capable of reaching the network-exposed RequestManagementSystem service; no specific non-default feature toggle is needed because the vulnerable export_getRequestCountersWeb method is callable by any authenticated user in a default installation. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The signals are strongly aligned toward high priority. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | A user holding any valid DIRAC credential (or an attacker who has phished/stolen one) sends a crafted DISET call to export_getRequestCountersWeb with a malicious groupingAttribute containing a Python dunder expression. Because AC:L/PR:L/UI:N, no special timing or victim interaction is needed; the payload traverses object internals to reach os and executes shell commands as the DIRAC service user. … |
| Remediation | Vendor-released patch: upgrade to DIRAC 8.0.79, 9.0.22, or 9.1.10, whichever matches your release line (8.0.x users go to 8.0.79, 8.1/9.0.x users go to 9.0.22, and 9.1.x users go to 9.1.10). … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours: isolate affected DIRAC servers from non-essential network access, revoke and regenerate all database credentials and grid user proxies stored by the system, and enable detailed logging of RequestManagementSystem access. …
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Same weakness CWE-95 – Eval Injection
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External POC / Exploit Code
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