Severity by source
AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Physical access mandatory (AV:P); no auth or interaction needed (PR:N/UI:N); full device compromise achieved, scope unchanged (S:U, C:H/I:H/A:H).
Primary rating from Vendor (zdi).
CVSS VectorVendor: zdi
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionCVE.org
Autel MaxiCharger AC Elite Home USB Heap-based Buffer Overflow Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows physically present attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Autel MaxiCharger AC Elite Home EV chargers. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the handling of custom USB packets. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of the length of user-supplied data prior to copying it to a fixed-length, heap-based buffer. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the device. Was ZDI-CAN-29048.
AnalysisAI
Heap-based buffer overflow in Autel MaxiCharger AC Elite Home EV chargers enables arbitrary code execution by physically present, unauthenticated attackers via malformed USB packets. The device's USB packet handler copies attacker-controlled data into a fixed-length heap buffer without validating input length, allowing full control of device execution context. Reported by Zero Day Initiative (ZDI-CAN-29048 / ZDI-26-436); no public exploit code identified at time of analysis and not listed in CISA KEV.
Technical ContextAI
The affected product is the Autel MaxiCharger AC Elite Home EV charging unit, identified by CPE cpe:2.3:a:autel:maxicharger_ac_elite_home:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*. The wildcard version field indicates all known versions are affected. The root cause is CWE-122 (Heap-based Buffer Overflow): the firmware's USB packet processing routine allocates a fixed-length heap buffer but does not validate the length of incoming packet payload before copying user-supplied data into it. An attacker crafting USB packets with oversized payloads can overwrite adjacent heap memory, corrupting control structures and ultimately hijacking the instruction pointer to execute arbitrary code on the embedded device. The attack surface is the physical USB port on the charger unit itself, which appears to accept custom protocol packets without any prior authentication handshake.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis - the ZDI advisory at https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-26-436/ should be monitored for firmware update announcements from Autel. Until a firmware fix is available, the primary compensating control is physical access restriction: secure the USB port with a tamper-evident cover or physical lock to prevent unauthorized USB device insertion - this directly eliminates the attack surface since AV:P is a hard prerequisite. For fleet or public charging environments, implement security camera coverage and access logging at charger locations to deter and detect tampering. Disable or physically block the USB port if it is not required for normal charging operations, noting that this may impact diagnostic or configuration workflows. Operators should treat any unexplained USB activity on these units as a potential security incident.
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Same weakness CWE-122 – Heap-based Buffer Overflow
View allSame technique Buffer Overflow
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-50559
GHSA-235j-grhc-6hqc