Google Chrome CVE-2026-113165

Exploitation requires a macOS user running Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.47 to actively visit or render a crafted HTML page (CVSS UI:R - user interaction required); no authentication is needed (PR:N) and default configurations are affected. The decisive limiting factor is that resulting code execution is confined to the Chrome renderer sandbox, so an attacker cannot reach the host OS, persist, or access files outside the sandbox without chaining a separate sandbox-escape vulnerability. Scope is further limited to the Mac platform per the vendor description.

Signals are moderately consistent but point to a lower real-world priority than the 8.8 base score alone suggests. The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) describes a network-reachable, low-complexity, unauthenticated flaw requiring user interaction, which Chrome's own rating tempers to 'Chromium security severity: Medium.' The single most important mitigating fact is explicit in the description: arbitrary code execution occurs 'inside the sandbox' (consistent with S:U, scope unchanged), so absent a chained sandbox escape the attacker is confined to the renderer process rather than the host OS. No EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public POC were provided, so there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and no evidence of active exploitation. The high CVSS/Medium-vendor-severity gap, plus the sandbox confinement, indicates this is a routine browser memory-safety patch to deploy promptly rather than an emergency: real impact depends on being combined with a second bug. Note the description's doubled 'on on Mac' typo and that affected scope is Mac-only; verify platform scope against the Chrome release notes.

An attacker hosts or compromises a web page containing crafted HTML that triggers a use-after-free in Chrome's Core component when rendered. A macOS victim running a vulnerable Chrome build (prior to 156.0.8078.47) visits the page and the attacker gains arbitrary code execution confined to the renderer sandbox. No public exploit code was identified at time of analysis, and meaningful host compromise would require chaining a separate sandbox-escape vulnerability.